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Attorney-client privilege, work-product protection, and the attorney’s 
ethical requirement to protect confidentiality of client information are at risk 
from commercial surveillance of online activity.  Behavioral advertising, 
data aggregation and sale, and government access to commercially 
assembled profiles have been denounced as threats to privacy and 
confidentiality interests, but the harm to attorney and client confidentiality 
is of particular concern. As the legal research and broader information 
industries shift from print materials to services on the internet, attorneys 
cannot simply avoid the online environment to protect confidentiality. This 
article examines the risk from tracking of online legal research and draws 
two conclusions: 1) Lawyers must take reasonable precautions to protect 
confidentiality of internet-based research; and 2) Reasonable precautions 
are elusive due to the constant evolution of tracking technologies and 
practices, so attorneys should work collectively to update best practices and 
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to evaluate and influence online industry activities so that the time-honored 
confidential nature of legal representation can be preserved.
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If an attorney and her client meet and review maps or other visual materials in 
front of a window onto a busy sidewalk, a court may find the material is not confidential.  
Similarly, if an attorney consults a legal treatise about a client’s case, makes notes and 
photocopies, and then leaves those notes and copies beside a cash register at a clothing 
store, that research material is not kept confidential.  These scenarios have easy solutions:  
pull shades over the windows, and keep research material locked in a briefcase.  
But how do these scenarios translate to the world of the internet?  Consider the 
attorney who explores a variety of online resources in support of developing legal advice, 
but in the process leaves a trail of search queries that are collected and merged to produce 
tailored advertising or perhaps to serve other purposes. Whether or not these activities 
were intended to be confidential, their exposure to third-party advertisers and potentially 
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to others could indicate that they are not in fact confidential. Solutions are not always as 
easy as pulling the shades or using a locked briefcase. Like most online researchers, 
attorneys and their clients are probably unaware of the growth of online tracking and are 
also not likely to understand how to implement and update a host of tools to reduce 
exposure of online activity.1 Some suggest that even sophisticated users of the internet 
are unable to effectively protect the confidentiality of online activity because both new 
and relatively older architectural technologies of the internet evade the tools of 
confidentiality available to consumers.2 
The online tracking industry is growing,3 inspired by decreasing costs of 
technology4 along with largely unregulated access to a vast amount of information sent 
online. A variety of theories would use existing law to restrict online tracking, but these 
                                                
1 Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Consumer Privacy, S. COMM. ON 
COMMERCE, SCI. & TRANS., 17–18 (July 27, 2010), 
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=057baf64-4393-4b42-8fe1-d216f45d3be0 
[hereinafter FTC Statement on Consumer Online Privacy] (reporting that the Commission’s public 
roundtables on consumer privacy in late 2009 and early 2010 produced a common theme that “consumers 
do not understand the extent to which companies are collecting, using, aggregating, storing, and sharing 
their personal information”).  The Wall Street Journal published a series of articles on increased online 
tracking of consumers in the summer of 2010.  See Julia Angwin & Tom McGinty, Personal Details 
Exposed via Biggest U.S. Websites, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2010, at A1 (reporting that the most-visited fifty 
U.S. websites installed an average of sixty-four tracking tools on the computers of individuals who visited 
those sites); see also infra Part IV (outlining various “reasonable precautions” for attorneys to implement in 
limiting their online exposure of clients’ confidential information). 
2  Leslie Harris, [Prepared] Testimony before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, & 
Consumer Protection, CTR FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., 2–3 (July 22, 2010), 
http://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT_privacy_bill_testimony.pdf (“[C]ollection, sharing, and use of online 
consumer data . . . are increasingly outside of consumers’ control.  Online, even very savvy consumers are 
being thwarted in their efforts to take technological steps to protect their privacy and are seeing the privacy 
decisions they make directly overridden.”); Nick Wingfield, Microsoft Quashed Effort to Boost Online 
Privacy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2010, at A1 (describing how advertising interests persuaded Microsoft not to 
make privacy features in its internet browser software, Internet Explorer, operate by default). 
3 This article uses the terms “online” and “internet” interchangeably. The use of online tracking tools to 
match advertisements with presumed purchasing preferences has increased dramatically in recent years.  
Stephanie Clifford, Ads Follow Web Users and Get More Personal, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at A1 
(reporting on the growth in use of tracking tools linked to the web browsing software on individual 
computers). While the global economy suffered during 2009, online advertising grew 2% to $55.2 billion. 
Online advertising spending is projected to increase at a rate of 11.9% compounded annually through 2014. 
Jared Jenks, Worldwide Ad Spending, EMARKETER (July 2010), 
http://www.emarketer.com/Reports/All/Emarketer_2000710.aspx (drawing on reports from twenty-three 
market research firms worldwide).  Companies that collect and compile information on individuals and 
resell it may be on the rise.  The advocacy organization Privacy Rights Clearinghouse lists contact 
information for over 100 data brokers said to collect information from public records, information publicly 
available on the internet, and possibly other sources. See Online Data Vendors: How Consumers Can Opt 
Out of Directory Services and Other Information Brokers, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://www.privacyrights.org/online-information-brokers-list (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).  The Federal 
Trade Commission has reported that commenters and panelists at recent privacy roundtables “raised 
concerns about the tendency for companies storing data to find new uses for that data.” FTC Statement on 
Consumer Online Privacy, supra note 3, at 19. 
4  Paul Rosenzweig, Privacy and Counter-Terrorism: The Pervasiveness of Data, 42 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 625, 627–29 (2010) (reviewing the logarithmic rates of increase in computing power and decrease 
in costs of data storage). 
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theories are largely untested, unsettled, or without broad application.5  Proposed federal 
statutes and regulations would limit the collection and sharing of data about online 
activity, but they have yet to result in clear protections.6  Given the lack of transparency 
in this data collection and reuse, and given the weakness of the law of tracking, any user 
of the internet seeking to maintain confidentiality of those activities is at a disadvantage.  
Attorneys and their clients face challenges in creating and maintaining confidentiality for 
privileged information reflected in online research.  In addition, attorneys are poorly 
positioned to protect their work-product and meet ethical requirements of 
confidentiality—and even competency—in this heavily monitored environment.  
¶ 1 This article brings to light the harm to attorney and client confidentiality from 
commercial tracking of online research and demonstrates how difficult it is for attorneys 
and clients to prevent this tracking.  The article suggests how attorneys should 
collectively develop best practices, both to guide individual attorneys and to encourage 
online industry support for confidentiality.  Finally, the article proposes that if these best 
practices fail to secure confidentiality of online legal research, attorneys and their clients 
should seek stronger legal protections for online confidentiality.  
II. OVERVIEW OF ONLINE TRACKING 
A. The Two-Way Mirror of Internet Research 
Many internet users consider online activity to be confidential because no person 
stands looking over their shoulders, but the reality is quite different.7  For most internet 
users, the online research process is similar to facing a two-way mirror. The computer 
screen displays information that reflects the queries and clicks entered but hides from 
view the monitoring and re-use of data about those queries and clicks.8  Without 
transparency, online researchers have little opportunity to evaluate the threat to 
confidentiality and limited ability to exercise control.    
¶ 2 The lack of transparency in online tracking practices is a function of several 
factors. A familiarity with information technology is required to understand the tools and 
practices of tracking.9 Tracking tools continue to evolve in order to elude consumer 
                                                
5 See infra Part II.C. 
6 Id.  
7 See Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets—A Journal Investigation Finds That One 
of the Fastest-Growing Businesses on the Internet is the Business of Spying on Consumers, WALL ST.  J., 
July 31, 2010, at W1 (“[T]he tracking of consumers has grown both far more pervasive and far more 
intrusive than is realized by all but a handful of people in the vanguard of the [internet] industry.”); Joshua 
Gomez et al., KnowPrivacy Report, KNOWPRIVACY 15, 18 (June 1, 2009), 
http://www.knowprivacy.org/report/KnowPrivacy_Final_Report.pdf  (comparing the privacy policies and 
practices of the most visited websites with surveys and polls of consumer expectations and finding a “large 
level of ignorance on the part of users about how data is collected”).  
8 The very architecture of the internet is intended to “hide all the details of the physical layout of the 
internet from the applications.” 1 W. RICHARD STEVENS , TCP/IP ILLUSTRATED: THE PROTOCOLS 5 (1994). 
9 As the recommendations for “reasonable steps” to protect confidentiality in this article demonstrate, 
even less-than-perfect protection from online tracking requires a fairly complex set of precautions to 
address the layered vulnerabilities.  The Federal Trade Commission reported that feedback collected 
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efforts to limit monitoring of their online behavior.10 Furthermore, online service 
providers and related industries have had limited motivation to explain their processes in 
any great detail.11 Some tracking of internet use is employed in secret because it is clearly 
malign,12 but this article highlights tracking conducted for cost recovery for business and 
for government purposes that are at least arguably benign.  This overview draws on 
recent investigative reports, online industry publications, privacy advocacy initiatives, 
legal scholarship, and testimony relating to potential regulation of online tracking to 
provide a picture of current tracking activities. 
B. Why They Track and How to Limit Their Tracking 
1. Websites 
A website needs to know some information about its visitors, such as their unique 
location on the internet, to be able to deliver the website’s content to each site visitor’s 
                                                                                                                                            
through its public roundtable discussions on privacy in late 2009 and early 2010 included concerns that the 
current environment “places too high a burden on consumers to read and understand lengthy privacy 
policies and then ostensibly to exercise meaningful choices based on them.” FTC Statement on Consumer 
Online Privacy, supra note 3, at 19. 
10 Rosenzweig, supra note 6, at 625, 627–32 (suggesting that practical limitations in “dataveillance,” the 
electronic “collection and analysis of personal data,” lie only in the capacity of search algorithms available 
to take advantage of exponential “increases in computing power and decreases in data storage costs”).  As 
consumers gain technological tools to prevent the display of advertisements, developers create new tools, 
and the process repeats.  See Ashkan Soltani et al., Flash Cookies and Privacy 3 (August 10, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1446862 (describing the adaptation of an 
internet tool in order to evade consumers’ attempts to prevent tracking); Press Release, comScore, Flash 
and Rich Media Ads Represent 40 Percent of U.S. Online Display Ad Impressions (June 29, 2010), 
available at 
http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2010/6/Flash_and_Rich_Media_Ads_Represent_4
0_Percent_of_U.S._Online_Display_Ad_Impressions (“[P]op-ups and pop-unders now represent less than 
1 percent of all display ad impressions, most likely a function of the pop-up blockers now standard in most 
browsers.”). 
11 Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control Over Personal 
Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 610–13 (2007) (noting that website owners had little motivation 
to provide accurate descriptions of their tracking practices, but instead benefited from writing overbroad 
notices of potential collection and re-use of visitor data because consumers did not read the policies); Peter 
Whoriskey, Every Click You Make, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2008, at D1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/03/AR2008040304052.html (reporting 
that NebuAd, Phorm, and Front Porch data collection companies were working with several internet service 
providers (“ISPs”) to track subscribers’ internet activities but that the ISPs would not respond to 
journalists’ inquiries about tracking practices). 
12 Sometimes the line between malign and benign tracking is difficult to draw because both can offend 
by happening without the knowledge or understanding of the consumer and because an apparently benign 
collection of data could later be re-used for an unforeseen and unwelcome purpose.  See, e.g., Daniel B. 
Garrie et al., Regulating Spyware: Challenges and Solutions, 13 No. 8 J. INTERNET L. 3, 4 (Feb. 2010) 
(stating that “[s]pyware blurs the existing line between a malicious virus and an aggressive Internet 
marketing tool,” but ultimately distinguishing spyware from programs that collect internet browsing data 
for advertising purposes).  See generally Heather Osborn Ng, Targeting Bad Behavior: Why Federal 
Regulators Must Treat Online Behavioral Marketing as Spyware, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 369, 
374–75 (2009) (comparing relative harms from spyware and tracking devices used for behavioral 
marketing).  
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computer.13 Websites may track use in some detail to support billing14 and system 
security,15 improve or personalize their systems,16 create new products,17 and target 
marketing of their own products or services.18  For example, when an attorney signs on to 
Westlaw and enters a username and password, the system will match that sign-on 
information to saved preferences which personalize the service for the attorney, such as 
the selection of “tabs” to display frequently used categories of Westlaw content.19  
Some fee-free website services may never know a visitor’s name or physical 
address and instead track each visitor by his access point to the internet (his “IP 
address”)20 and by assigning a unique identifier to the software he uses to browse the 
internet.21  Many websites also track each visitor’s activity on a site through invisible 
programs called “web bugs” that are embedded in the display of the web page.22   
                                                
13 1 STEVENS, supra note 10, at 33–34 (providing a detailed description of how information travels 
across the internet, including how a visit to a website requires the delivery of information from an internet 
information provider to the visitor’s particular internet address). 
14 For example, the PACER database of federal court filings has a rather elaborate billing structure, 
which must require detailed tracking.  PACER, http://www.pacer.gov (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) (charging 
$0.08 per page for court documents, but only for the first thirty pages (with some exceptions), and waiving 
fees for users whose quarterly bills would otherwise be $10 or less). 
15  See, e.g., Frederick Lah, Note, Are IP Addresses “Personally Identifiable Information”?, 4 I/S: J.L. 
& POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 681, 693 & nn.68–69 (2008) (explaining that search engines track IP addresses 
to account for or prevent “click fraud,” a false accrual of clicks on advertisements).  Google defends its 
retention of search queries and their associated IP addresses as “tremendously helpful” for “protecting our 
networks from hackers, spammers, and fraudsters. For example, bad actors continually seek to manipulate 
our search ranking, launch denial-of-service attacks, and scam our users via email spam or malware. We 
use our log files to track, block, and keep ahead of the bad guys.” [Prepared] Testimony of Dr. Alma 
Whitten, Privacy Engineering Lead, Google Inc., S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI. & TRANS., 9–10 (July 27, 
2010), http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=f67ebd69-a109-433b-ae34-
abbcce06aa33 [hereinafter Testimony of Dr. Alma Whitten].  Fee-based online legal research system 
Westlaw tracks use to identify unusual or excessive uses that might suggest impermissible uses in violation 
of terms of service by law students limited to academic use.  Telephone Interview with Jeff Rohlmeier, 
Director of Privacy and Compliance, Thomson Reuters (May 27, 2010) (notes on file with author). 
16 See, e.g., Simplifying Legal Research: Thomson Reuters Rolls Out WestlawNext at LegalTech, 27 No. 
10 LAW. PC 1 (Feb. 15, 2010) (describing how Westlaw product developers used “log analysis” of legal 
professionals doing legal research on Westlaw to identify and improve their system to support habits of 
researchers); Testimony of Dr. Alma Whitten, supra note 17, at 9 (defending Google’s retention of search 
queries and their associated IP addresses, stating that “this data is actually tremendously helpful to us in 
improving our products”). 
17 For example, Google publishes a Flu Trends report based on the geographical locations associated 
with IP addresses of individuals entering queries that Google assumes reflect a local case of the flu.  See 
Testimony of Dr. Alma Whitten, supra note 17, at 10; Flu Trends, GOOGLE.ORG, 
www.google.com/flutrends (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).  
18 See Ron A. Dolin, Search Query Privacy: The Problem of Anonymization, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. 
L.J. 137, 142–44 (2010) (describing the utility of non-anonymized search data to search engines, to the 
individual user, to governments, and to society).  
19 Customizations are available to subscribers.  See, e.g., Westlaw Advantage: My Westlaw, WEST, 
http://west.thomson.com/westlaw/advantage/tools/my-westlaw/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
20 This IP or Internet Protocol address is represented by a series of numbers punctuated by periods.  See 
infra note 25 and accompanying text.  
21 Microsoft Explorer and Mozilla Firefox are two commonly used browsers. See Nick Eaton, IE Use 
Back Up, Firefox Use Down in June, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, (July 6, 2010), 
http://blog.seattlepi.com/microsoft/archives/213689.asp (reporting that Internet Explorer’s market share for 
June 2010 was sixty percent and Mozilla Firefox’s was twenty-four percent). Websites usually 
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 These tracking practices are said to protect the anonymity of the researcher, but 
the integrity of IP address anonymity in particular has been challenged.23 
“Anonymization” and “personally identifying information” are terms of contested 
application in the context of online tracking, largely due to the risk of re-identifying 
individuals if anonymous data is merged with identifying data.24  Even query information 
alone has been used to identify the individual researcher.25  This problem can be 
exacerbated when an attorney conducts a “vanity search” of his own name in a search 
                                                                                                                                            
automatically transfer “cookies” or short programs to the researcher’s computer to report back information 
about the researcher’s use of the website.  “Session cookies” are erased when the browser is closed.  
“Persistent cookies” remain active whenever the browser is opened and for varying periods of time.  Laura 
McCarthy & Dave Yates, The Use of Cookies in Federal Agency Web Sites: Privacy and Recordkeeping 
Issues, 27 GOV. INFO. Q. 231, 233 (2010).  Flash cookies are a persistent variety of cookies not dependent 
on or controlled by most browsers that can be used to reinstall regular cookies researchers deleted through 
their browsers.  Soltani et al., supra note 12, at 3–4 (reporting that more than 50% of 100 most visited 
websites used flash cookies and identifying a limited number of tools consumers can use to restrict deposit 
or to remove flash cookies).  
22  “Web bugs,” also known as “beacons” or “clear GIFs,” are programs that track activity on a website, 
including what the visitor types and where the mouse cursor moves on the webpage.  Angwin, supra note 9 
(examining the fifty most popular U.S. websites’ use of cookies, flash cookies, and web bugs). “Web bugs” 
occupy a one-by-one pixel on the display of a webpage and so are effectively invisible to the website 
visitor. Gomez et al., supra note 9, at 8. 
23 Whether IP addresses are “personally identifying” is debated.  Some cable and broadband internet 
subscribers now have static, assigned IP addresses, so those addresses can identify a subscriber’s location, 
if not a particular user of the connection. Some researchers gain internet access via dynamic IP addresses 
that are assigned at each online session, so they might have a variety of IP addresses connected to their 
online activity and any identifying information.  On the other hand, a single IP address may be used by 
different persons in the same household or by different persons who use wireless internet access at a retail 
site, such as a coffee shop. Dolin, supra note 20, at 149–50 (explaining how multiple users and multiple 
locations can obscure the ability to connect a particular researcher with an IP address, but demonstrating 
how IP addresses can be mapped to a location using public information); Lah, supra note 17, at 688–95, 
699–704 (explaining how IP addresses work and noting disagreement about the ease or reliability of 
inferring identity from IP addresses); see also Joshua J. McIntyre, The Number is Me: Why Internet 
Protocol (IP) Addresses Should Be Protected as Personally Identifiable Information, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011),  available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1621102; Paul Ohm, 
Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA. L. REV. 
1701 (2010) (exploring more generally the problem of privacy law’s reliance on anonymization in light of 
ease of re-identification); Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-Location Technologies and Other Means of 
Placing Borders on the “Borderless” Internet, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 101, 109–10 
(2004) (describing how geo-locational services can build databases to identify the location associated with 
IP addresses). Examples of services that determine the location of an IP address—including that of visitors 
to their websites—include:  WEBHOSTING.INFO, http://ip-to-country.webhosting.info (last visited Feb. 20, 
2011); IP2LOCATION, http://www.ip2location.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2011); WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM, 
http://whatismyipaddress.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2011); IP ADDRESS LOCATION, 
http://ipaddresslocation.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). 
24 Ohm, supra note 25, at 1704.  See infra Part II.B.4. 
25 Consider the release by internet service provider AOL of the queries entered over a three month 
period and presumably rendered anonymous by the assignment of numbers in place of any other personal 
identifier.  Searches for “landscapers in Lilburn, Ga,” “dog that urinates on everything,” “60 single men,” 
and “numb fingers” were used to identify sixty-two year old Thelma Arnold.  Michael Barbaro & Tom 
Zeller, Jr., A Face is Exposed for AOL Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A1.  
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engine because that name becomes part of the profile.26  Similarly, if an attorney uses a 
search engine to see what information is retrieved in a search on the client’s name, or if 
the attorney enters the client’s name as part of the sign-on procedure for a fee-based 
service, all of the search data can be associated with the client’s name.27 
Most websites also regularly collect the “URL” or web address of a page that 
linked to them.28 This information is called the “referring URL.”  Sometimes the 
referring URL contains information such as the name of a displayed document or the 
search query used on a search engine such as Bing or Google.29  Sites also regularly 
collect the date and time that a researcher from a particular IP address visits their site.30 
Some websites may retain user information indefinitely.  Others may delete it or 
remove personally identifying elements after making use of the full records for billing, 
system improvement, or marketing purposes.31  Data retention increases the chances of a 
security breach or other access, so short periods of retention help maintain 
confidentiality.  Anonymization of user data is the next best approach.32   
When tracking is done by the website a researcher visits, that data collection is 
considered “first party” tracking.  In contrast, a “third party” would be a different entity 
                                                
26 Christopher Soghoian, The Problem of Anonymous Vanity Searches, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. 
SOC’Y  299 (explaining how anonymizing tools for internet use fail when researchers perform searches on 
their own names).   
27 For example, Westlaw sign-on includes a field for “Client ID.” Westlaw Sign-On, Westlaw, 
https://web2.westlaw.com/signon/default.wl?newdoor=true (last visited Feb. 20, 2011). Of course, an 
attorney can use a code for the client so that identifying information is not shared with the research system. 
28 The very architecture of the World Wide Web incorporated an early interest of website owners in 
knowing how others linked to their sites, allowing information providers to discover “documents” that 
referred to them.  See Tim Berners-Lee, Information Management: A Proposal, 4 (1989–1990), 
http://www.w3.org/History/1989/proposal.html (proposing a non-hierarchical hypertext linking system for 
information sharing with goals including answers to the question “What documents refer to this one?”). 
The referring URL is just one data element commonly collected from all visitors to websites using basic 
“web log” software or more sophisticated services such as Google Analytics. “[M]ost Internet service 
providers (ISPs) supply a freeware log analyzer with their web-hosting accounts.”  BRIAN CLIFTON, 
ADVANCED WEB METRICS WITH GOOGLE ANALYTICS 20–23 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining that page tags (a.k.a. 
web bugs) that work with cookies to collect information from website visitor’s browsers have become a 
popular method for collecting website user data); see also Google Analytics, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/analytics/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2010).  Google may be able to confirm the author’s 
visit on that date. 




6d12389e3c08,” and a Bing search for “hit and run laws” generated  
“http://www.bing.com/search?q=hit+and+run+laws&form=QBRE&qs=AS&sk=AS3&pq=hit+and+run+&
sp=4&sc=8-12.”  If a researching attorney were to click on the advertisements displayed in the margin next 
to these searches’ results, those advertisers could read within the linking URL the attorney’s research topic, 
connecting that search query with the attorney’s IP address and the time he or she clicked on the ad. 
30 Gomez et al., supra note 9, at 8. 
31 For example, Google has stated that it anonymizes IP addresses after nine months. Testimony of Dr. 
Alma Whitten, supra note 17, at 9.   
32 But see Dolin, supra note 20, at 142, 148, 152–54 (arguing that anonymization of search engine query 
records that link queries to IP addresses and potentially to individuals is both insufficient and unnecessary 
for privacy protection and an unwise tradeoff, as “it is difficult to overstate the vast number of potential 
uses for search query information, which are limited only by one’s imagination”). 
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with whom the website may share tracking information or whom the website may allow 
to collect information directly from its website visitors.33  Researchers have some options 
for reducing tracking or the confidentiality-threatening effects of tracking by first party 
websites, but each precaution is insufficient in some way and must be updated in 
response to evolving tracker and tracker-blocking technologies.  
¶ 3 As a first step, attorneys using subscription services can negotiate for contract 
terms that limit collection and reuse of data or that limit data retention or provide some 
level of anonymization of retained data.  For fee-free websites, attorneys can look for 
similar reassurances in posted privacy policies and can avoid supplying personally-
identifying information to the website.  Another precaution would be to avoid linking to a 
website from search query results or a displayed document to prevent potential exposure 
to the new website of identifying confidential information in a referring URL. The 
attorney would have to cut and paste the address of the new website into the browser 
instead of linking to the site.  A related strategy is to link only from web pages that 
provide encryption, since most browsers are configured to prevent transmission of the 
referring URL from encrypted web pages.34  These precautions address collection and use 
of data by first party websites, but as the sections that follow show, additional precautions 
are necessary to address a variety of third parties who may track online research. 
2. Third Party Advertisers 
Attorneys’ online legal research may be tracked by advertising companies placing 
ads through a network of websites on behalf of entities that wish to promote their 
products or services.35  Online advertising is on the rise and provides the funding for 
many website services.36  Some advertisements for third party products or services are 
                                                
33 In the context of attorney and client confidentiality, any person other than the attorney or client is 
generally referred to as a “third party.” See infra Part III.  Further confusion arises in the internet context in 
categorizing affiliates of the website visited.  See infra Part II.B.3.  For a humorous example of how these 
terms may be applied, see  the contract scene from A NIGHT AT THE OPERA (MGM Studios 1925), 
transcript available at http://www.nightattheopera.net/contract.html. 
34  Google promises that use of its encrypted Search option usually triggers browser software to prevent 
the display of the referring URL from Google Search to a website linked from Google Search results.  SSL 
Search: Features, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/support/websearch/bin/answer.py?answer=173733&hl= en (last visited Feb. 20, 
2011).  Most search engines, however, including Bing and Google Scholar, did not offer an encrypted 
search option at the time of this writing. 
35 The Federal Trade Commission has focused attention on privacy and confidentiality issues relating to 
online behavioral advertising, and recommended guidelines for industry self-regulation in February of 
2009.  FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 
(2009) [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT ON BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf.  In July of 2010, the FTC reported that industry 
self-regulation efforts were “still in their developmental stages” yet “encouraging.” FTC Statement on 
Consumer Online Privacy, supra note 3, at 14. 
36 Increases in online advertising have been touted as a sign of a recovering economy.  WebVisible; Q2 
Search Trends Signal Recovery – SMB Ad Spend Up 160 Percent Over a Year Ago, Job Recruitment 
Services and Luxury Categories Spending More, According to WebVisible Report, MARKETING WEEKLY 
NEWS, Aug. 7, 2010.  Google reports that their “products are free to individuals for personal use, supported 
by revenue from online advertising.”  Testimony of Dr. Alma Whitten, supra note 17, at 1. 
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delivered to any visitor to a particular website.37  Increasingly, though, tracking is 
performed by network advertisers who collect information about a researcher’s activity 
across multiple websites over some period of time to provide a personalized form of 
advertising.38  This “behavioral marketing” attempts to develop a rich profile of 
consumer interests in order to match them with products and services.39  For example, if 
an attorney searched a newspaper website for “hit and run” and then used a maps website 
to find more information about a particular location in Sacramento, the network 
advertising company working with these two websites could connect these two searches 
and attempt to match its advertising clients’ products or services with this information.  
The attorney might see online advertisements for Sacramento law firms specializing in 
automobile accidents on any of the websites in the advertiser’s network of websites.40      
Some advertisers claim that they protect the privacy of online researchers by 
avoiding the use of “sensitive information” as a basis for targeted ads,41 but definitions 
and practices vary,42 and the wide range of issues involved in legal representation are 
poorly addressed through these types of exceptions to the use of data collected.  While 
                                                
37 The Federal Trade Commission defines “contextual advertising” as “advertising  based on a 
consumer’s current visit to a single web page or a single search query that involves no retention of data 
about the consumer’s online activities beyond that necessary for the immediate delivery of an ad or search 
result.”  FTC STAFF REPORT ON BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 37, at iii. Cookies and web bugs 
can send information about website visitors directly to third parties. Angwin, supra note 9.  
38 The Federal Trade Commission has worked with advertisers and consumers to address conflicting 
interests relating to behavioral advertising.  The FTC proposed a set of principles to guide industry self-
regulation including: (1) transparency and consumer control, (2) reasonable security and limited data 
retention, (3) express consent from the consumer for material changes in privacy policies, and (4) express 
consent from the consumer before sensitive data such as data about children, health, or finances are used 
for behavioral advertising.  FTC STAFF REPORT ON BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 37, at 11–12. 
39 Angwin & McGinty, supra note 3; Angwin, supra note 9; Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, On the Web’s 
Cutting Edge, Anonymity in Name Only, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2010, at A1 (demonstrating the use of 
aggregated data about online activity and public records to profile potential credit card applicants); see also 
Center for Digital Democracy, U.S. PIRG, and World Privacy Forum, “In the Matter of Real-Time 
Targeting and Auctioning, Data Profiling Optimization, and Economic Loss to Consumers and Privacy. 
Complaint, Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief: Google, Yahoo, PubMatic, 
TARGUSinfo, MediaMath, eXelate, Rubicon Project, AppNexus, Rocket Fuel, and Others Named Below,” 
FTC filing, 8 Apr. 2010 [hereinafter Complaint Before the FTC In the Matter of Real-Time Targeting], 
available at http://www.democraticmedia.org/files/u1/20100407-FTCfiling.pdf (detailing and protesting 
integration of information about online browsing habits and offline information about individuals and other 
tracking practices for targeting marketing).  
40 This example illustrates the benefits of online tracking for attorneys who wish to advertise their 
services to potential clients.   
41 See, e.g., Testimony of Dr. Alma Whitten, supra note 17, at 5 (testifying that “Google does not serve 
interest-based ads based on sensitive interest categories such as health status or categories relating to 
children under 13”). 
42 The Federal Trade Commission has called for more specific standards on what constitutes sensitive 
information. FTC STAFF REPORT ON BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 37, at 44.  Pending legislation 
would give highest protection to “sensitive information” defined as: (1) medical history, physical or mental 
health, or provision of health care to the individual; (2) race or ethnicity; (3) religious beliefs and 
affiliation; (4) sexual orientation; (5) financial information or records; and (6) precise geo-location 
information; (7) unique biometric data; and (8) social security number. “Building Effective Strategies to 
Promote Responsibility Accountability Choice Transparency Innovation Consumer Expectations and 
Safeguards Act” or BEST PRACTICES Act, H.R. 5777, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter BEST 
PRACTICES Act], available at http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.uscongress/legislation.111hr5777.   
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such categories could add some level of protection for issues attorneys and their clients 
might address in online research, legal representation involves a variety of issues, not all 
of which are likely to qualify as “sensitive information.”   
Attorneys must adjust their research strategies and take a number of steps to 
implement technologies to block the tools of third party advertiser tracking.  Mastering 
the privacy settings on internet browser software can limit a number of tracking tools 
either directly or indirectly.43  Because tracking tools have adapted to elude these 
precautions, online researchers now have to take additional steps beyond electing browser 
settings.44 A bevy of additional opt-out steps address tracking by particular third parties.45 
In addition, attorneys must confirm that subscription contracts and no-fee sites’ privacy 
policies promise not to share with third parties the information they collect using first 
party tools.  Of course, these precautions are effective only until the tools of tracking and 
counter-tracking are updated.   
                                                
43 Setting browsers to avoid collection of third-party cookies prevents the use of this tool and may 
disable web bugs as well.  Gomez et al.,  supra note 9, at 4 (“Our analysis of web bugs revealed that they 
are ubiquitous on the web . . . and effective controls for this tracking technology are lacking.”).  “Web 
beacons cannot be removed or deactivated by the user because they do not reside on the user’s computer.  
Some sites—such as Yahoo—offer users the ability to click on an ‘opt-out’ button, which blocks web 
beacons placed by the website.” Francoise Gilbert, Beacons, Bugs, and Pixel Tags: How the United States 
and Europe Regulate Behavioral Targeting 702–03 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. 
Course, Handbook Ser. No. 969, 2009), available at 969 PLI/Pat 699.  If web bugs work in conjunction 
with cookies, blocking or deleting cookies can disable the web bug.  In addition, some developers have 
created programs that can be added onto particular browsers to disrupt the function of web bugs.  Jennifer 
Valentino-Devries, How to Avoid the Prying Eyes: The Internet is Rife with Surveillance Technology, but 
You Can Cover Some of Your Tracks, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2010, at W3. 
44 “Flash cookies” are short programs downloaded from websites through Flash Player software and 
used to support animation and related media used by some websites.  Flash cookies have been adapted to 
reinstall regular cookies after consumers delete them.  Flash cookies themselves are not controlled by 
browsers, so researchers must take other steps to limit their use for third party tracking.  Adobe, the maker 
of the Flash Player software, has updated its software to allow internet users to adjust settings on Flash 
Player to prevent third party tracking.  See Flash Player Security and Privacy, ADOBE, 
http://www.adobe.com/products/flashplayer/security/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).  In addition, several 
“plug-in” pieces of software are available to work with some browsers to allow varying levels of control 
over Flash cookies.  Valentino-Devries, supra note 45. 
45 See Opt Out of Behavioral Advertising, NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, 
http://networkadvertising.org/managing/opt_out.asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2010); Ng supra note 14, at 385 
(noting that NAI opt-out does not cover all advertisers because not all have joined the consortium). 
Google’s Ads Preferences Manager allows users to adjust their profiles or opt-out of receiving 
advertisements through Google’s advertising services. This choice requires the downloading of an opt-out 
cookie that Google has said may not be cleared by the researcher’s browser settings.  See Testimony of Dr. 
Alma Whitten, supra note 17, at 5; Privacy Center: Advertising and Privacy, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/privacy/ads (last visited Jan. 21, 2011).  Some websites allow site visitors to opt-
out of tracking by web bugs that are embedded on web page displays.  See Gilbert, supra note 45, at 703.  
Google Analytics, a software and service provided by Google to websites for collecting “web log” analysis 
of site visitors and their visits, allows consumers to opt-out by going to Google’s website.  See Google 
Analytics Opt-Out Browser Add-On Download Page, GOOGLE, http://tools.google.com/dlpage/gaoptout 
(last visited Jan. 21, 2011). 
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More systemic approaches are available in the form of software designed to 
support an anonymous online presence.46  Unfortunately, these systems have drawbacks 
and may not succeed in protecting anonymity from third parties.47 
3. Website Affiliates 
Some websites share information about site visitors with their corporate parent 
and sibling companies, all of whom may be considered “affiliates.”48  Whether affiliate 
access to information about individuals’ online research habits is first party or third party 
access is murky territory, both in terms of the expectations of website visitors and the 
actual practices of website owners.  For example, an attorney researching immigration 
law in LexisNexis might trigger the mailing of a flyer or sending of an email promoting a 
handbook on immigration law published by Matthew Bender, a legal publishing business 
managed by LexisNexis Group, the same business group that manages LexisNexis the 
online legal research company.49  In this example, the attorney likely recognizes 
LexisNexis and Matthew Bender as connected and relevant to her legal research.  This 
sharing might fit within the attorney’s broad definition of a first party legal research 
service provider. But LexisNexis Group also contains LexisNexis Risk Holdings 
companies, including data aggregators and resellers long known as Choicepoint and 
Accurint, so these data resellers could be treated by LexisNexis Group as affiliates of the 
LexisNexis legal research service.50  An attorney, however, might consider sharing legal 
                                                
46 Omer Tene, What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1433, 
1465–66 (explaining how Tor and TrackmeNot create some anonymity online and concluding that 
drawbacks have led to low use of these anonymizers). 
47 Christopher Soghoian points out that use of sophisticated tools to anonymize all internet use have 
steep costs to the user such as inability to take advantage of any cookie technologies or slowed 
communications.  Soghoian also warns that selected use of encryption can draw attention from entities 
employing internet traffic analysis through wiretap or network level access to users’ data.  Soghoian, supra 
note 28 (commenting on the selected use of encryption and on implementation of tools such as Tor and 
TrackMeNot); Richard Abbott, An Onion a Day Keeps the NSA Away, J. INTERNET L., May, 2010, at 22, 
27–28 (2010) (explaining that Tor does not work with all internet browsers and that “new users should 
consult an expert before trusting Tor with anything important”); see also Jeremy Clark, P.C. van Oorschot 
& Carlisle Adams, Usability of Anonymous Web Browsing: An Examination of Tor Interfaces and 
Deployability (2007) (unpublished manuscript,  presented at the Symposium on Usable Privacy and 
Security 2007), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.64.8672  (finding 
none of the deployment options for anonymizer Tor to be satisfactory from a usability perspective). 
48 See Gomez et al., supra note 9, at 4 (reporting that a majority of the fifty most visited U.S. websites 
posted policies stating site visitor information could be shared with affiliates, and reporting that parent 
companies for these websites had on average 297 subsidiaries that could be considered affiliates).  For 
example, Google owns an advertising service called DoubleClick, DoubleClick, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/doubleclick (last visited Aug. 11, 2010), and another such service is owned by 
Yahoo!, YAHOO! ADVERTISING SOLUTIONS, http://advertising.yahoo.com/media-kit/ (last visited Feb. 13, 
2011).  See also Tene, supra note 48, at 1447–50 (positing the possibility that Google Search could link 
query records with personally identifying information supplied by an individual who registers for affiliate 
services such as Gmail or Google Calendar). 
49 See Company Profile, LexisNexis Group, Corporate Affiliations, LEXISNEXIS CORPORATE 
AFFILIATIONS, http://corporateaffiliations.com/ (profile generated March 3, 2011). 
50 Id.  The LexisNexis online legal research service privacy policy states that information it collects 
from website visitors is used to support the visitor’s customer relationship with LexisNexis Group, not 
simply with the LexisNexis legal research service.  See LexisNexis Privacy Statement, LEXISNEXIS, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/privacy/statement.aspx (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).  Whether this sort of 
sharing actually happens is a separate question. A spokesperson for LexisNexis stated that “[i]nformation 
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research details with these services to be more like sharing with a third party, particularly 
if the information shared could be added to a profile of the attorney or of the attorney’s 
client in the data resellers’ databases.  So, while limiting tracking to first party collection 
and use of data may prevent exposure of data to unrelated third parties, the affiliate 
problem blurs the line between first and third party tracking.  
4. Data Resellers 
Aggregation and resale of data about individuals or households is another 
expanding business that could make use of search query and web search habits.  The 
practices of data resellers or data brokers have been described as “opaque,”51 but some 
evidence points to the potential for, and even current practice of, merging online tracking 
data with other information collected by data resellers.52  This integration of data sets 
presents the opportunity for previously anonymous online tracking information tied only 
to IP addresses or browser identifiers to become tied to email addresses, street addresses, 
and other personal identifiers.  The resulting profiles also present a threatening scenario 
for access to the topics, if not the details, of online legal research.   
Data resellers generally assemble information from public records, information 
available publicly, and nonpublic information.53  Established data brokers tend to limit 
access to their collected information to businesses and to governments.54  Some data 
resellers, though, market their services through the internet to any purchaser willing to 
pay a fee.55  Reseller Acxiom testified before a House subcommittee in 2009 that its 
practices exceeded industry standards for protection of consumer information.56  Acxiom 
explained that it collected data from “public sources, self-reported data from consumers, 
and data from companies who sell products and services to consumers.” 57  Acxiom 
defended its practices, stating that the company does not “sell detailed or specific 
                                                                                                                                            
about an individual’s use of LexisNexis legal research services is not shared with the Accurint service or 
any ChoicePoint service.  Searches through the LexisNexis legal research service that access our public 
records databases are stored by LexisNexis Risk Solutions, which operates those public records databases.  
However, such searches are stored and used only for billing, data security and regulatory compliance 
purposes.  Thus data about individuals’ use of LexisNexis legal research service are never merged with data 
that are within the Accurint and Choicepoint databases used to offer services.” E-mail from LexisNexis 
spokesperson to author (Sept. 8, 2010) (on file with author).    
51 FTC Statement on Consumer Online Privacy, supra note 3, at 18.  
52 See Whoriskey, supra note 13.  
53 Identity Theft: Governments Have Acted to Protect Personally Identifying Information, but 
Vulnerabilities Remain: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Info. Policy, Census & Nat’l Archives, Comm. 
on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, H.R., 111th Cong. 10 (2009) (statement of Daniel Bertoni, Dir., Educ., 
Workforce, and Income Sec., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09759t.pdf (explaining gaps in regulation of data resellers). 
54 Id. 
55 Id.; see also Jennifer Barrett, Written Testimony of Acxiom Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Trade & Consumer Protection and the Subcommittee on Communications, Technology & the InternetH. 
COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE 8 (Nov. 19, 2009) 
http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/Media/file/Hearings/CTCP/111909_Privacy Joint Offline 
Online collection/Testimony/Barrett Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Written Testimony of Jennifer Barrett, 
Acxiom] (stating that reseller Acxiom “licenses data . . . to qualified businesses, non-profits, political 
organizations and candidates” and provides some of its services “directly to the consumer”). 
56 Written Testimony of Jennifer Barrett, Acxiom, supra note 57, at 17. 
57 Id. at 2 (Executive Summary). 
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transaction-related information on individuals or households.”58 Acxiom further offered 
that it only provides access to sensitive information in some of its databases,59 and “does 
not collect or acquire online browsing or search activity on consumers.”60  A complaint 
filed with the Federal Trade Commission, however, asserts that advertising companies 
are merging information from data resellers with proprietary online behavioral data to 
create targeted marketing “at the household level.”61  Just how far this merging of data 
and use of profiles has developed is not clear, but if the profiles can target a household, 
anonymity of online activity has been lost.  This downstream use of online research data 
could mean an attorney’s online search queries for hit-and-run law and maps of a 
Sacramento intersection might trigger a postcard from a local auto accident firm to be 
delivered to his home or office. Even more startling, these merged records and resulting 
profiles might be available for purchase by businesses, the government, and other 
attorneys.  
5. Internet Service Providers 
Internet service providers (ISPs) have a number of reasons to track the content of 
traffic that comes through their systems, including limiting malicious activity, managing 
heavy or light traffic, cooperating with copyright holders concerned about illegal access 
to proprietary material, and monetizing data reflecting their customers’ activities on the 
internet.62  ISPs have access to the full range of content traveling across their portion of 
                                                
58 Id. at 18.  Acxiom either acquires or translates detailed customer data into “very general summary 
data that indicates possible lifestyle or interest intelligence” and does not “use detailed transaction data.”  
Id. at 15. 
59  Id. at 7–8 (explaining that Acxiom did not provide sensitive information that could contribute to 
identity theft to its marketing customers, but did provide such information as a key part of “identity and risk 
solutions”). 
60 Id. at 15.  Acxiom did not explain whether this omission is a result of market factors such as the high 
cost of such information or whether forbearance was part of a policy that Acxiom described as exceeding 
industry standards for protection of consumer information.  Id. at 17.  Presumably, Acxiom would have to 
match data elements in the anonymous online browsing and search activity with data elements in other 
records to be able to link the formerly anonymous information with specific individuals or households.  See 
generally Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1455–
1460 (explaining how anonymization is ineffective in protecting privacy of individual researchers). 
61 Complaint Before the FTC In the Matter of Real-Time Targeting, supra note 41, at 15.  Data reseller 
Acxiom testified in November 2009 that seventy percent of the company’s revenue came from “interactive 
marketing services and advertising solutions.”  Written Testimony of Jennifer Barrett, Acxiom, supra note 
57, at 3. 
62 Armen Aghasaryan et al., Personalized Application Enablement by Web Session Analysis and 
Multisource User Profiling, BELL LABS TECHNICAL J., Jun. 2010, at 67 (outlining methods for internet, cell 
phone, and web television service providers to monetize access to individual subscribers’ communications); 
Ohm, supra note 62, at 1423–27 (describing the motivations for ISPs to monitor the contents of 
communications passing through their systems); Mike Coward, Deep Packet Inspection Optimizes Mobile 
Applications, EDN, Oct. 8, 2009, at 37, available at  http://www.edn.com/article/458406-
Deep_packet_inspection_optimizes_mobile_applications.php (explaining how inspection of the contents of 
internet communications can allow service providers to prioritize or set tiered pricing by type of 
communication in order to address challenges to capacity of internet infrastructure); Peter Whoriskey, 
Every Click You Make, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2008, at D1 (reporting that NebuAd, Phorm, and Front Porch 
data collection and network advertising companies were working with several internet service providers to 
track subscribers’ internet activities).  For more about the related “net neutrality” debate over whether 
internet service providers should be prevented from filtering or creating tiers of internet access based on 
deep packet inspection, see generally John G. Palfrey, Jr. & Robert Rogoyski, The Move to the Middle: The 
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the internet through a technique called “deep packet inspection.”63  If internet service 
providers were to track the online activity of attorneys, the impact to confidentiality 
would be severe, because these providers could review and retain the full record of 
websites visited, time of those visits, queries entered, and documents viewed, along with 
other online activities such as emails sent and received and documents shared 
electronically. 
The researcher can prevent deep packet inspection by using encryption.64  
Website addresses that begin with “https” rather than “http” indicate the use of encrypted 
internet communications.65  While some research websites such as LexisNexis, Westlaw, 
and Google Search allow for this encrypted communication,66 a number of websites that 
attorneys use in developing legal advice for a client do not support encryption.67  For 
example, twenty-seven state bar associations provide access to the legal research service 
Casemaker as a benefit of membership, but this service does not offer encrypted access.68   
6. Government 
The government can conduct its own sort of third party tracking of internet 
research by using law enforcement or national security tracking techniques.  In addition, 
a wealth of law and policy information is published on government websites, so 
attorneys’ legal research can be tracked by the government acting as a first party tracker 
when attorneys use those sites.  To some extent, both of these government threats to 
attorney and client confidentiality raise different questions than commercial tracking does 
                                                                                                                                            
Enduring Threat of “Harmful” Speech to the End-to-End Principle, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 31 (2006) 
(examining a trend toward regulation of internet communications intermediaries). 
63 Ohm, supra note 62, at 1437–40 (explaining how ISPs can monitor their subscribers’ internet use). 
64 Encrypted internet communication is available through what is called the Secure Socket Layer 
protocol.  See Ohm, supra note 62, at 1439. 
65 See Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors in 
the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 375 (2010) (explaining the protections offered by 
“HTTPS encryption”). 
66  See https://www.lexisnexis.com, https://web2.westlaw.com, and https://encrypted.google.com.  
Wikipedia, which attorneys and courts consult for a number of background topics relevant to client and 
litigation issues, provides encrypted access at https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Main_Page.  
Regarding Factcase, see infra note 69. 
67 For example, Microsoft’s search engine Bing (http://www.bing.com/) does not support encrypted 
searching, nor do legal research providers Casemaker (http://www.casemaker.us/) or Findlaw 
(http://www.findlaw.com/) or search service Google Scholar-Legal Opinions and Journals 
(http://scholar.google.com/).  This lack of support likely stems from the fact that encryption can be difficult 
and expensive for the website owner, and may slow the communication process for the website visitor.  See 
Ohm, supra note 62, at 1439; Soghoian, supra note 67, at 377–78. 
68 See CASEMAKER, http://www.casemaker.us (last visited Aug. 30, 2010). At the time of this writing, 
Casemaker has promised that it is working on providing encrypted access.  Emails from Shannon R. 
Morris, Casemaker Customer Service Representative, to author (Aug. 30, 2010) (on file with author).  
Fastcase, a legal research service provided as a benefit of membership in seventeen states and other smaller 
bar associations, does support encryption at https://www.fastcase.com/.  Robert J. Ambrogi, Legal 
Research Pits Casemaker vs. Fastcase, L. TECH. NEWS, July 31, 2009, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202432654587 (comparing features 
of Casemaker and Fastcase other than confidentiality); Greg Lambert, Don't Know What Free Legal 
Resources Your State Bar Provides You? Here's a Map!, 3 GEEKS & A L. BLOG (Mar. 9, 2010, 11:32 AM), 
http://www.geeklawblog.com/2010/03/dont-know-what-free-legal-resources.html.(displaying an interactive 
map of state bar associations’ legal research service choices). 
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because constitutional, statutory, and policy protections against government collection 
and use of information operate separately from the law of private collection of data.69  
These issues are equally important to attorney and client confidentiality of legal research, 
but this article focuses on commercial tracking of online behavior, so these first and third 
party government tracking practices are reviewed only for their relationship to 
commercial tracking.   
The tracking practices of government websites vary and may or may not be 
governed by law.70  Executive policy for federal agency websites recently relaxed 
restrictions on the use of tracking devices such as cookies,71 but the policy includes a 
number of protections that could preserve confidentiality of an attorney’s legal research 
on these sites.  Federal agency websites now track site visitors in order to measure use 
and to improve and customize site design, but agencies are restricted from sharing 
collected data with other agencies and may not cross-reference the data with any 
personally identifying information.72  These restrictions on sharing and on identification 
of anonymous site visitors should protect the anonymity of research on these systems.  
For example, if an attorney researched a client company’s filings on the U.S. Securities & 
Exchange Commission (SEC) website, the fact that she viewed those files on a particular 
date could be of evidentiary value in an SEC investigation.  But the policy prevents the 
                                                
69 See Robert P. Mosteller & Kenneth S. Broun, The Danger to Confidential Communications in the 
Mismatch Between the Fourth Amendment’s “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” and the Confidentiality 
of Evidentiary Privileges, 32 CAMPBELL L. REV. 147, 188 (2010) (comparing Fourth Amendment and 
attorney-client privilege applications); William Wetmore, Note, Hijacking the Privilege:  Balancing 
Fairness and Security When Warrantless Wiretapping Threatens Attorney-Client Communications, 2 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 187 (2008) (raising questions about warrantless wiretapping for national security 
and the threat to attorney-client confidential communications); see also Paul M. Schwartz, Reviving 
Telecommunications Surveillance Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 287, 310–315 (2008) (describing current 
oversight of government surveillance under federal statutes as ineffective “privacy theater” and arguing for 
specific reporting requirements).  Professor Kenneth W. Graham Jr. has suggested that attorney-client 
privilege may not survive government surveillance if the attorney or client has reason to believe the 
surveillance is occurring, but that if the client cannot prevent government surveillance, the privilege might 
yet apply to prevent use of the information at trial.  24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, 
JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 5484 (West 2010). 
70 A number of states require privacy policies and procedures for their government websites.  See, e.g., 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4151, 41-4152 (2010); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2054.126 (West 2010); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3800-03 (2010).  The National Conference of State Legislatures maintains a list of 
state statutes addressing privacy policies for state government websites, last updated October 19, 2009.  
State Laws Related to Internet Privacy, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13463#govpolicies (last visited Aug. 25, 2010). 
71 A federal executive policy limiting tracking tools on agency websites was relaxed in June of 2010.  
“For government agencies, the potential benefits of web measurement and customization technologies are 
clear.  With the help of such technologies, agencies will be able to allow users to customize their settings, 
avoid filling out duplicative information, and navigate websites more quickly and in a way that serves their 
interests and needs.  These technologies will also allow agencies to see what is useful to the public and 
respond accordingly.  Services to customers and users can be significantly improved as a result.”  
Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Off. of the President, to the 
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies, M-10-22, 1  (June 25, 2010) [hereinafter Federal Agencies Website 
Memorandum], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-22.pdf; see also 
McCarthy & Yates, supra note 23 (exploring the implications of planned expansion of tracking of visitors 
to federal agency websites). 
72 Federal Agencies Website Memorandum, supra note 73, at 4. 
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SEC from tracing the IP address in order to connect the files viewed with the attorney and 
client.73  This example serves as a possible model for terms of use that attorneys might 
seek with commercial research websites.  
Because internet service providers may try to monitor and monetize the details of 
the full range of online activity, government website use can become the subject of 
commercial tracking.  If the government website offers encrypted access, however, the 
ISP is unable to track research details.  The PACER database containing court filings for 
most federal courts is a good example of a government site that supports encryption,74 but 
a number of government websites used by lawyers do not provide the confidentiality 
protection of encrypted connections.  For example, the Supreme Court of the United 
States site, the Thomas website of federal legislative information, and the GPO Access 
website with federal regulations all fail to support encryption.75  
Another interaction between government data collection and commercial tracking 
of online legal research is the potential for stored user data to be made available to 
government for a variety of purposes.  Government may use legal process to obtain 
tracking information from commercial entities such as websites and internet service 
providers for law enforcement and national security purposes.76 Depending on the 
commercial entity’s practices, government may acquire information about online activity 
through a simple request or by purchasing the data.77  Google has posted a map to report 
the number of government requests it has received for data about the use of some Google 
services through any of these methods.78 The federal government is reportedly a large 
customer for many commercial data brokers79 and has sought information about internet 
                                                
73 But see Soltani et al., supra note 12, at 4 (reporting that the Whitehouse.gov site disclosed tracking 
technology but did not specify that Flash cookies were used). 
74 In fact, PACER allows only encrypted access to its system. See, e.g., PACER, 
https://pacer.login.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/login.pl (last visited Aug. 30, 2010). 
75 See, e.g., SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/ (last visited Aug. 
30, 2010); THOMAS, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov (last visited Aug. 30, 2010); 
GPOACCESS, U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).  Over 
nineteen percent of attorneys in the United States report that a government website is the free website they 
use most often for legal research.  2010 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY 
REPORT, ONLINE RESEARCH VOL. 5, at 43 (2010).  Just under five percent of attorneys report regularly 
beginning their legal research on government websites. Id. at 39. 
76 See infra Part II.D on the law of tracking.   
77 Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How Choicepoint and Other Commercial Data 
Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595 
(2004) (chronicling law enforcement access to some website and data broker information and citing to 
documents obtained by privacy advocacy organization EPIC through Freedom of Information Act requests 
detailing FBI reliance on records available through public records aggregator Choicepoint (citing 
Choicepoint, EPIC, http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2010))).  
78 See Government Requests—Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE, 
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/governmentrequests/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2010). The number 
of requests for disclosure of user data from United States government agencies between July 1, 2009 and 
December 31, 2009 was 3,580.  Most of these requests are reported to be related to criminal investigations. 
FAQ – Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/faq (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2010). 
79 Accurint markets itself as “the most widely accepted locate-and-research tool available to 
government, law enforcement and commercial customers.” ACCURINT, http://www.accurint.com/hr (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2011).  A whole set of Accurint services  is marketed specifically to government through 
Accurint for Government. These services are touted as being “[u]sed by more than 3,000 agencies across 
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browsing records for national security and law enforcement purposes and defense of 
legislation.80   
Attorneys can adopt the contractual and technological precautions already 
discussed to limit commercial access to government website use and to limit government 
access to online research details that could be collected and stored by first party and third 
party commercial tracking.  To secure a greater level of protection by first party 
commercial legal research systems, attorneys could negotiate for assurance that, when 
legally possible, the provider will contact the subscriber before complying with 
government requests for information that describes the attorney’s use of the service.   
7. Bad Actors 
Bad actors intent on spreading destructive software, collecting information for the 
purpose of identity theft or trade secret theft, or otherwise disrupting online traffic could 
find ways to track online legal research.81  Malicious tracking flourishes through flaws in 
security, so the best precautions are steps to reduce third party tracking in general and to 
avoid websites that deliver malicious tracking tools.  Virus or malware protection 
software, particularly a program that integrates with a browser, can warn of potentially 
harmful sites.82 
                                                                                                                                            
the country.”  Accurint for Government, LEXISNEXIS INVESTIGATIVE SOLUTIONS, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/government/solutions/investigative/accurint.aspx (last visited March 3, 2011). 
80 Ellen Nakashima, White House Proposal Would Ease FBI Access to Records of Internet Activity, 
WASH. POST, July 29, 2010, at D1 (reporting that some internet service providers have resisted the FBI’s 
use of national security letters to obtain data about internet browsing histories because it is not clearly 
authorized under current law) (“One senior administration government official, who would discuss the 
proposed [legislative] change only on condition of anonymity, countered that ‘most’ Internet or e-mail 
providers do turn over such data.”); see also Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing 
Importance of Justification Standards, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1514, 1543–44 (2010) (noting the types and low 
number of law enforcement requests for internet service provider records that could be considered fishing 
expeditions).  
81 Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyberterrorism and Using 
Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 57, 79–80 (2010) (describing 
vulnerabilities of the internet to a variety of malicious tools that track or worse); see also [Prepared] 
Testimony of Ari Schwartz, Deputy Director, Center for Democracy and Technology, before the Financial 
Services and General Government Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, on 
“Consumer Protection Issues”, CDT, 1–2 (Feb. 28, 2007), 
http://old.cdt.org/privacy/20070228schwartzftc.pdf (advocating increased support to the Federal Trade 
Commission to combat the threat to online commerce and expression from increases in malicious online 
tracking); Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the propriety of Contractual Consent to 
Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1545, 1558–62 (2006) (describing how spyware can track 
keystrokes and so all the information about online and offline activities on one’s computer).   
82 Daniel E. Harmon, Effective PC Defense: Expert Guardians Are Emerging, But Smart Computing is 
Central, LAW. PC (Thompson Reuters/West, St. Paul, MN), May 15, 2010, at 1 (recommending security 
features for software that screens and removes malware). 
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C. The Law Governing Online Tracking 
Commercial tracking of internet use is minimally regulated.  Website privacy 
policies, required by a few states83 and investigated by the Federal Trade Commission if 
found to be unfair or deceptive,84 provide insights into tracking practices linked to 
particular websites, but in general, these policies are criticized as confusing, incomplete, 
difficult to locate,85 of unclear contractual status, and easily changed, even 
retroactively.86  Subscription-based online research services, especially legal research 
services whose primary clients are attorneys or even bar associations, provide more 
opportunity for negotiation and enforcement of confidentiality-protecting contractual 
protections.  Other laws have limited or unclear effect on tracking internet research.  
Minnesota and Nevada prohibit internet service providers from reselling personally 
identifying information about their customers, and the Minnesota statute goes so far as to 
require the customer’s authorization before most instances of sharing information about 
search queries and information viewed, but the vast majority of states have no such law.87  
Scholars have proposed tort or property remedies, but these approaches have not been 
                                                
83  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–79 (West 2009) (requiring prominent posting of a policy which 
outlines collection of particular types of information and describes any third-party uses); CONN. GEN STAT. 
§ 42-471(2010) (requiring privacy policy for websites that collect social security numbers). 
84 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the 
marketplace. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006). For information relating to FTC enforcement of website privacy 
policy cases, see Privacy Initiatives: Enforcement, FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/promises_enf.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2010).  At least two 
states also have statutes that prohibit making a false or misleading statement in a privacy policy displayed 
on a website. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-302(14) (2009); 18 PA. CONST. STAT. § 4107(a)(10) (2010). 
85 Ty Tasker & Daryn Pakcyk, Cyber-Surfing on the High Seas of Legalese: Law and Technology of 
Internet Agreements, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 79 (2008) (critiquing website policies and terms that are 
difficult for site visitors to find); Soltani et al., supra note 12, at 4 (finding website installation of tracking 
tools known as flash cookies was rarely disclosed in privacy policies of sample websites). 
86  The applicability of contract law to website privacy policies has been rejected by a number of 
scholars.  See, e.g., Haynes, supra note 13 (noting that consumers are most likely to dispute rather than 
support contractual validity of website privacy policies that give notice of broad collection and use of 
consumer data); Mark Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 475–76 (2006) (arguing that 
“browsewrap” online terms of use that do not require the consumer to click through the terms fail to 
establish consumer agreement and should not be enforced as a contract against the unsuspecting consumer). 
But see, Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? Lessons Learned and 
Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against Sears, 8 NW. J.  TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2009).  Website 
privacy policies that reserve the right to change the terms unilaterally may be unenforceable.  See Peter A. 
Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do What!? Limitations On The Use Of Change-Of-Terms 
Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099, 1130–45 (2010) (arguing that reservation of the right to alter contract 
terms should be presumptively unenforceable and noting such terms in the terms of use of internet service 
provider Comcast, online legal research systems LexisNexis and Westlaw, and internet seller of books and 
other things Amazon, among others).  
87 See MINN. STAT. § 325M.01–09 (2011).  This law requires “the authorization of the consumer” before 
the internet service provider may disclose “personally identifiable information,” except in certain 
situations.  MINN. STAT. § 325M.03–04.  “Personally identifiable information” is defined in Minnesota to 
include “Internet or online sites visited by a consumer,” any information that identifies “a consumer as 
having requested or obtained specific materials or services from an Internet service provider,” and the 
consumer’s “physical or electronic address or telephone number.” MINN. STAT. § 325M.01. 
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widely tested.88  Any sectoral privacy laws that apply online offer insufficient 
confidentiality for the range of topics attorneys may research on behalf of their clients.89    
Fourth Amendment and First Amendment protections might provide limits on 
government access to commercially collected information about online research, but 
scholarly proposals have not yet produced doctrine that clarifies this intersection of 
protections.90 Fourth Amendment precedent provides minimal barriers to government 
access to information voluntarily shared with commercial parties,91 although the 
application of this “third-party doctrine” to the content of information sought and viewed 
online is not clear.92  National security investigations are limited by more relaxed 
                                                
88 Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 
96 GEO. L.J. 123, 125–27 (2007) (arguing that the English tort of confidentiality could inform U.S. privacy 
law); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055 (2004) 
(proposing a property model for personal information that would protect information privacy); Michael R. 
Siebecker, Cookies and the Common Law: Are Internet Advertisers Trespassing on Our Computers? 76 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 893, 894 (2003) (arguing that cookies stored on a user’s computer may constitute a trespass 
to chattels); see also Max Stul Oppenheimer, Internet Cookies: When is Permission Consent? 85 NEB. L. 
REV. 383, 403–04 (2006) (describing government use of a cookie to collect information from a corporate 
visitor to a government website as a taking of a trade secret). 
89 See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2006). 
90 Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2009) (arguing that privacy of search 
engine use and other actions or expressions revealing intellectual activity should be protected by the First 
Amendment); Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U.L. REV. 112 
(2007) (arguing that the intersection of First and Fourth Amendments should produce heightened protection 
against government access to speech records such as search queries and ISP records of anonymous 
speakers); see also Julie Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Close Look at “Copyright Management” 
in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996) (advocating statutory protection for First Amendment values 
threatened by commercial tracking of readers); Elbert Lin, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response 
to the Internet, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085 (2002) (arguing for both federal and state constitutional 
protection for information privacy). 
91 Under the “third party doctrine” of the Fourth Amendment no reasonable expectation of privacy 
protects from government intrusion the “voluntary” disclosures of information to a third party.  See United 
States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[E]-mail and Internet users have no expectation of 
privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit because 
they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific 
purpose of directing the routing of information.”); see also City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S.Ct. 2619 
(2010) (declining to determine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy in the online environment of a  
public employer supplied text messaging service, explaining that “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of 
communication and information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what 
society accepts as proper behavior”); Jon D. Michaels, All the President's Spies: Private-Public Intelligence 
Gathering in the War on Terror, 96 CAL. L. REV. 901 (2008) (examining the ease with which government 
can obtain data from commercial sources such as data brokers and online service providers). 
92 Orin S. Kerr, Applying The Fourth Amendment To The Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 1005 (2010) (arguing that a content/envelope distinction should apply to information communicated 
through the internet and that warrants specifying particular persons should be required for government 
access to this content).  But see Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105 (2009) (proposing constitutional protection for content-revealing IP addresses 
or URLs of websites an online research visits).  Law enforcement nonetheless seeks greater ease of access 
to information including requiring internet service providers to retain records of browsing history for two 
years and to share that data when presented with a national security letter, a form of administrative 
subpoena. See Delcan McCullagh, FBI Wants Records Kept of Web Sites Visited, CNET NEWS, Feb. 5, 
2010, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10448060-38.html (reporting FBI’s call for legislation to require 
internet service providers to collect and retain browsing records for subscribers for at least two years); 
Nakashima, supra note 82 (reporting on executive branch requests for amendment to the Electronic 
2011 Klinefelter, When to Research is to Reveal  21 
 
Vol. 16 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY No. 01 
 
standards under the Fourth Amendment and under various statutes, including provisions 
that would prevent cooperating parties from revealing that they have disclosed data to the 
government.93  Other legal restraints on monitoring online activity include the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act94 and the Stored Communications Act,95 but these laws 
were written for older technologies, and their utility in the evolving symbiotic web has 
been questioned, particularly when the data collector is agreeable to sharing tracking 
data.96  Attorney-client privilege itself may bar government access to or use of 
commercially collected legal research records, but the research must have been 
performed under conditions that meet privilege standards for confidentiality.97  
 Legislation has been introduced to provide greater transparency and more 
consumer control over the collection of data about their online research.98  Agencies have 
angled for authority over online privacy or confidentiality,99 and the Federal Trade 
Commission in particular has been active in investigating related complaints and 
publishing guidelines to support industry self-regulation.100  But the stakes are high for 
information collectors both commercial and governmental, and consumers are only just 
                                                                                                                                            
Communications Privacy Act to allow law enforcement access to internet browsing records without court 
involvement). 
93 See Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for A Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 435, 444–51 (2008) (reviewing national security laws governing access to individuals’ 
information). 
94 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006). 
95 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2006). 
96 If one of the parties to a communication consents to disclosure, the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act is not violated.  18 U.S.C. § 2511(a).  See In re Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (finding that website owners had consented to advertisers’ collection of user data and finding no 
violation of the Electronic Communications Act, Stored Communications Act or Computer Abuse and 
Fraud Act); In re Pharmatrack, 329 F. 3d. 9 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that neither users nor website 
consented to range of data collected by advertiser).  But see In re Pharmatrack, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 292 
F.Supp. 2d 263 (D. Mass. 2003) (finding on remand that advertiser did not have intent required for 
violation of Electronic Communications Act); Ohm, supra note 62, at 1477–89 (arguing that the Electronic 
Communications Act may prevent many forms of monitoring by internet service providers but that the 
statute also needs to be updated); Orin Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a 
Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004) (outlining and identifying gaps in 
the Stored Communications Act). 
97 Mosteller & Broun, supra note 71. 
98  Building Effective Strategies To Promote Responsibility Accountability Choice Transparency 
Innovation Consumer Expectations and Safeguards Act' or the “BEST PRACTICES Act,” H.R. 5777, 
111th Cong. (2010); Boucher-Stearns Staff Discussion Draft: A Bill to Require Notice to and Consent of an 
Individual Prior to the Collection and Disclosure of Certain Personal Information Relating to that 
Individual H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE  (May 3, 2010), 
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100719/BoucherStearnsprivacydiscussiondraft.
pdf. 
99 Federal Trade Comm’n, Comments In the Matter of Info. Privacy & Innovation in the Internet Econ., 
Before the Nat’l Telecomm. Info. Admin., U.S. Dept. of Commerce (June 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/comments/100402174-0175-01/attachments/FTC%20Comments.pdf (pointing out 
overlapping interests of the Department of Commerce, the Federal Communications Commission and the 
Federal Trade Commission in regulating privacy in the online environment). 
100 FTC STAFF REPORT ON BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 37. A number of relevant 
enforcement actions are chronicled by the Federal Trade Commission on their website. See Privacy 
Initiative, FEDERAL. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/promises_enf.html (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2010). 
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beginning to appreciate the extent to which their personal information is tracked and 
used, so any new legislative or regulatory approaches face conflicts among these various 
stakeholders.   
D. The Need for Technology in Market Solutions 
Because commercial tracking of internet legal research is not effectively limited 
by law, attorneys and their clients must rely on technological control and market 
influence to protect confidentiality. The previous overview of online tracking identified 
some counter-tracking strategies for individual attorneys, but these precautions are 
cumbersome and ever-evolving and may not provide enough protection to meet 
requirements under the law and rules of attorney and client confidentiality.  The next 
section considers how the law and rules of confidential legal representation might address 
online research that is tracked.  Following that analysis, a summary of reasonable 
precautions is proposed, as well as recommendations for collective efforts that can help 
individual attorneys create and preserve a confidential environment for online research. 
III. CONFIDENTIALITY INTERESTS IN LEGAL RESEARCH 
A. Two Threats from Online Tracking 
The law and rules of attorney and client confidentiality indicate that tracking 
presents two threats.  First, tracking could prevent recognition of the online environment 
as a place where a reasonable expectation of confidentiality is possible.  The second 
threat is that tracking will produce a limited or general disclosure that constitutes waiver 
of privilege and work product and violates the attorney’s ethical commitment to 
confidentiality.  
B. Attorney-Client Privilege 
The attorney-client privilege is recognized in every state and federal jurisdiction 
in the United States101 and is the oldest communications privilege in the United States,102 
with over five hundred years of recognition at common law.103 Like other evidentiary 
privileges, the attorney-client privilege allows “a person who communicated in 
confidence or who possesses confidential information to shield the communication of 
information from compelled disclosure during litigation.”104  
                                                
101 GRAHAM C. LILLY, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE 325 (4th ed. 2006); EDWARD J. IMWRINKELRIED, THE 
NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:  EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES, app. D (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter 
THE NEW WIGMORE] (identifying relevant statutes in rules in the states). 
102  See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). 
103 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
104 THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 103, at § 1.1 (describing the operation of evidentiary privileges). 
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 Most states have codified the privilege as a rule of evidence.105  In federal courts, 
when federal law applies, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 directs that the law of privileges 
“shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the 
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.”106 
The attorney-client privilege may serve a number of purposes.  The generally 
accepted purpose is to encourage “full and frank communication between attorneys and 
their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and 
the administration of justice.”107 Other justifications relate to recognition of the attorney’s 
moral duty to maintain confidentiality of the client relationship or respect for autonomy 
of the client through protection of the fiduciary nature of the attorney’s role.108  
The privilege is held by the client, and the attorney has a duty to protect the 
confidentiality of the communications to preserve the privilege.109  In federal court, the 
application of the privilege is said to be a “question of fact, to be determined in the light 
of the purpose of the privilege and guided by judicial precedents.”110  The federal 
common law and the law of the states on attorney-client privilege have produced some 
jurisdictional variations on the scope and application of attorney-client privilege.111   
 
In a much-cited opinion from 1978, the Fifth Circuit held that one who claimed 
attorney-client privilege must establish the following elements:    
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client;  
(2) the person to whom the communication was made  
(a) is (the) member of a bar of a court, or his subordinate and  
(b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer;  
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed  
(a) by his client  
(b) without the presence of strangers  
(c) for the purpose of securing primarily either  
                                                
105 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §40.225 (2007); CAL. EVID. CODE § 952 (West 2010). For a chart of state 
privilege laws, see THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 103, at app. D. 
106 FED. R. EVID. 501.  Rule 503 specifically outlining the contours of the attorney-client privilege was 
promulgated by the Supreme Court but not enacted by Congress which favored the more flexible common 
law approach of Rule 501.  Prop. Fed. R. Evid. 503, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972). 
107 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; see also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527, 531–32 (2d Cir. 
2005); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (citing Jessel, M.R. in Anderson v. Bank, 2 
Ch. D. 644, 649 (1876)); WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 2290. Another purpose, not often recognized by 
modern courts, is linked to the historical barrister’s code of honor, loyalty, and fairness. See In re Grand 
Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d at 531 (comparing JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 343–
46 (5th ed. 1999) with CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 5472, at 71–77 (1986) on whether the honor purpose co-exists with the utilitarian purpose or 
was supplanted by it).  When the attorney’s honor held sway as the dominant rationale, the privilege was 
available only to the attorney, so the client had no claim for confidentiality of communications with his 
attorney. WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 2290.  
108 Professor Edward J. Imwrinkelried is a proponent of the client autonomy justification as a 
humanistic normative approach.  THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 103, § 5.3.3.   
109 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 68(c), 86 (2000). 
110 In re Auclair, 961 F.2d 65, 68 (5th Cir. 1992).    
111 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 501, which states that privileges such as attorney-client are “governed by the 
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of 
reason and experience.”   
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(i) an opinion on law or  
(ii) legal services or  
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not  
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and  
(4) the privilege has been  
(a) claimed and  
(b) not waived by the client.112 
 The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers adopted in 2000 describes the 
elements of attorney-client privilege as “(1) a communication (2) made between 
privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal 
assistance for the client.”113  This later articulation reflects the evolution of the privilege 
to embrace not just communications from the client to the attorney, but all 
communications between the attorney and client.114 
The attorney-client privilege has also evolved to embrace sharing confidential 
communications with some categories of persons other than the attorney and client.115  
The traditional rule is that third party access to otherwise-privileged information prevents 
the establishment of or constitutes waiver of confidentiality.116 However, a number of 
exceptions have been recognized.  Confidentiality is maintained despite the sharing of 
privileged information with a subordinate117 or agent118 of the attorney, the functional 
equivalent of the client’s employees,119 or someone necessary to the provision of legal 
                                                
112 United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 938 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978). 
113 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §68 (2000).  
114 Protection of attorney communications to clients was already in development in the federal courts at 
the time of United States v. Kelly.  See Mead Data Central v. U. S. Dept. of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 254 
n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (privilege protects communications from attorney to client as well as from client to 
attorney); Gregory C. Sisk & Pamela J. Abbate, The Dynamic Attorney-Client Privilege, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 201, 217 n.92 (2010) (noting changes in the scope of attorney-client privilege). 
115 Michele DeStafano Beardslee, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Third-Rate Doctrine for 
Third-Party Consultants, 62 SMU L. REV. 727 (2009) (arguing for application of the privilege to 
communications shared with third-party consultants whenever the nexus between outside expertise and 
legal advice is strong); Mark D. Hinderks, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Presence of Third Parties 
Necessary to Facilitate Attorney-Client Communication or Legal Advice, 76 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 16 (2007) 
(reviewing cases in which third parties have been embraced by the attorney-client privilege). 
116 WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 2317.    
117 United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921–22 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding accountant’s involvement in 
attorney-client communications did not waive the privilege because expertise allowed lawyer to give better 
legal advice). “[T]he complexities of modern existence prevent attorneys from effectively handling clients’ 
affairs without the help of others; few lawyers could now practice without the assistance of secretaries, file 
clerks, telephone operators, messengers, clerks not yet admitted to the bar, and aides of other sorts.” Id. at 
921.   
118 Id. (“[T]he privilege must include all the persons who act as the attorney’s agents.”) (quoting 
WIGMORE, supra note 105, § 2301; Annot., 53 A.L.R. 369 (1928)). See also Kelly, 569 F.2d at 938 
(distinguishing between communications shared with a subordinate of the attorney and those shared with 
strangers). 
119 See, e.g., In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938 (8th Cir. 1994).  In some circumstances, an employee of 
the client communicating with the attorney may be considered covered by the privilege.  Gifford v. Target 
Corp., Civ. No. 10-1194, 2010 WL 2771896, at *8 (D. Minn. 2010) (citing Diversified Indus., Inc. v. 
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977)).   
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advice.120  Foreign language translators, accountants, appraisers, financial consultants, 
engineers, and even public relations consultants have been found to be necessary to 
informed provision of legal advice and not therefore destroyers of privilege.121  
An attorney’s consultation of a legal research tool or service should easily meet a 
test of necessity in the rendering of legal advice.122 For some types of research, courts 
have held that consultation of internet-based research tools is a necessary part of due 
diligence.  Certainly, lawyers are using online research tools on a regular basis, with a 
majority reporting that they regularly begin legal research using online sources.123   
Courts have held that attorney-client privilege protects legal research,124 legal 
research memoranda,125 and bills detailing cost and content of legal research.126  The 
                                                
120  See, e.g., Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(“The traditional waiver doctrine provides that disclosure to third parties waives the attorney-client 
privilege unless the disclosure serves the purpose of enabling clients to obtain informed legal advice.”); 
Exp.-Imp. Bank of U. S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232 F.R.D. 103, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
(“[C]ommunications with a financial advisor are covered by the attorney-client privilege if the financial 
advisor's role is limited to helping a lawyer give effective advice by explaining financial concepts to the 
lawyer.” (citing Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922)). 
121 See In re Grand Jury Investigations, 918 F.2d 374, 384 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he presence of third 
parties, if essential to and in furtherance of the communication, should not void the privilege.”); Hawes v. 
State, 7 So. 302, 313 (Ala. 1890) (“It is equally well established law that an interpreter, intermediary, agent, 
or clerk of an attorney, through whom communications between attorney and client are made, stands upon 
the same footing as his principal, and will not be allowed to divulge any fact coming to his knowledge as 
the conduit of information between them.”); see also Beardslee, supra note 117; WIGMORE, supra note 105, 
§§ 2301, 2311.  Instances of sharing with third parties necessary for the rendering of legal advice have been 
called “facilitative revelations.” CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., 24 FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5485 (2010)(Westlaw). 
122 The author concedes her bias as a law librarian. 
123 Thirty-four percent of attorneys responding to a recent American Bar Association survey begin a 
research project using internet/online services that are fee-based, and forty-four percent of respondents 
begin research projects using internet/online services that are free. AM. BAR ASS’N LEGAL TECH. 
RESOURCE CENTER, 2010 LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT: ONLINE RESEARCH (vol. V), at 21 
(2010).  Some courts have suggested due diligence requires online research, including research of the 
internet using a search engine such as Google. See, e.g., Davis v. Dept. of Justice, 460 F.3d 92, 103 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (questioning the adequacy of FBI search techniques in identifying parties relevant to documents 
requested under FOIA, stating “one has to ask why—in the age of the Internet—the FBI restricts itself to a 
dead-tree source . . . . Why, in short, doesn't the FBI just Google the [two parties]?”); Munster v. Groce, 
829 N.E.2d 52, 62 n.3 (Ind. App. 2005) (dismissing claim for insufficient service of process because of 
failure to prove due diligence where court found a Google search would have produced a potential lead for 
missing litigant); Dubois v. Butler, 901 So.2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. App. 2005) (dismissing on insufficient 
service of process grounds because of lack of due diligence in failure to use, among other things, the 
internet or other modern technology to conduct search ). See also Hagopian v. Justice Admin. Comm’n, 18 
So. 3d  625, 642 (2009) (“Lawyers have also become expected to use computer-assisted legal research to 
ensure that their research is complete and up-to-date.” (citing Michael Whiteman, The Impact of the 
Internet and Other Electronic Sources on an Attorney’s Duty of Competence Under the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 89, 103 (2000))); Carol Levitt & Mark Rosch, Making 
Internet Searches Part of Due Diligence, 29 LOS ANGELES LAWYER 46 (2007).  
124 Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200, 206 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he research undertaken by an 
attorney to respond to a client's request also falls within the reaches of the privilege.”). 
125 Guy v. United Healthcare Corp., 154 F.R.D. 172, 179 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Hewes v. Langston, 853 
So.2d 1237, 1247 (Miss. 2003) (finding that the legal research memo falls within the purview of attorney-
client privilege). 
126 Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F. 3d 394, 402 (4th Cir. 1999); In re Grand Jury Witness, 695 F.2d 359, 
362 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[B]ills, ledgers, statements, time records and the like which also reveal the nature of 
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inclusion of legal research in attorney-client communications has been used as a measure 
for whether communications are sufficiently law-related to fit within the scope of the 
privilege.127 By identifying permissible ways that attorneys might re-use or share their 
expanded understanding of the law gained from legal research performed on behalf of a 
particular client, the Restatement implicitly acknowledges that legal research details 
reflect privileged communications.128  Some online research tools provide non-legal 
information, but research using these tools should be well within the scope of the 
privilege if the information sought is necessary for the rendering of legal advice, and the 
search terms and documents viewed reflect privileged communications between the 
attorney and client.129  
In addition, some state legislatures have expanded the definition of confidentiality 
to accommodate potential exposure of privileged information to providers of electronic 
communication services.130  If this approach is followed, the use of the internet in and of 
itself will not be a barrier to a finding of confidentiality.  
Recognition of these third parties as possible participants in confidential 
communications, though, is insufficient to protect privilege if these actors fail to preserve 
confidentiality.131  Courts have not required the attorney and client to explicitly discuss or 
                                                                                                                                            
the services provided, such as researching particular areas of law, also should fall within the privilege.”); 
Cardenas v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. Civ. 99-1421, 2003 WL 21302957 (D. Minn. May 16, 2003) 
(sustaining trial court’s finding that billing records revealing the subjects of legal research were protected 
by attorney-client privilege). 
127 See, e.g., State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Toledo-Lucas City Port Auth., 905 N.E.2d 1221, 1228 
(Oh. 2009) (“[T]he absence of legal research in an attorney’s communication is not determinative of 
privilege, so long as the communication reflects the attorney's professional skills and judgments. Legal 
advice may be grounded in experience as well as research.” (quoting Spectrum Sys. Intern. Corp. v. Chem. 
Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 1991))). 
128 “During legal research of an issue while representing a client, a lawyer may discover a particularly 
important precedent or devise a novel legal approach that is useful both in the immediate matter and in 
other representations. The lawyer and other members of the lawyer's firm may use and disclose that 
information in other representations, so long as they thereby disclose no confidential client information 
except as permitted [under other exceptions.]” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 
59(e) (2000). The Restatement identifies no cases on this point but bases the statement on “the principles 
behind the concept of generally known information, the customary and accepted practices of lawyers, and 
the public interest in effective professional practice consistent with the general protection of confidential 
client information.” Id. at cmt. e. 
129 If the attorney provides services other than legal advice, and those services are not intertwined with 
legal advice, the privilege is generally not extended in order to avoid abuse of the deviation from a larger 
commitment to revelation of truth.  See Sisk & Abbate, supra note 116, at 240 (advocating application of 
the privilege when attorneys provide advice in matters relating to or overlapping with the law). 
130 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 917(b) (2010) (“A communication between persons in a relationship 
listed in subdivision (a) does not lose its privileged character for the sole reason that it is communicated by 
electronic means or because persons involved in the delivery, facilitation, or storage of electronic 
communication may have access to the content of the communication.”); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4548 (MCKINNEY 
2010) (same); See also Ford Motor Co. v. Hall-Edwards, 997 So. 2d 1148, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) 
(citing Florida Stat. § 90.502 which explicitly protects as confidential communications shared with third 
parties in furtherance of the rendering of legal advice and with those third parties necessary to deliver those 
communications). 
131See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 147 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding 
privilege was maintained in privileged documents when “each intended recipient was bound by corporate 
policy or, in the case of the contractors, by a separate understanding, to keep confidential the contents of 
the documents.”).    
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agree to contractual terms for confidentiality,132 but similar assumptions are not realistic 
in the context of internet research given the growth of online tracking and data re-use.   
The level of secrecy required for confidentiality varies by jurisdiction and by the 
circumstances in each case.133  Most courts look for a “reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality,” which requires both a subjective expectation and implementation of 
objectively reasonable precautions.134  Importantly, these standards are generally distinct 
from the test for Fourth Amendment privacy protections, where the focus is on an 
individual’s privacy; here, the focus is on a relationship.135   
Reasonable precautions play several pivotal roles in privilege analysis and, of 
course, in the protection of confidentiality.  First, courts may look to precautions as 
contemporaneous evidence of intent to establish or maintain confidentiality.136  Second, 
reasonable precautions are required in many jurisdictions as an objective component in 
the establishment of a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.137  Third, reasonable 
precautions can help protect privilege even when disclosure nonetheless occurs.138  
                                                
132 WIGMORE, supra note 105. 
133 United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 n.1 (“Deciding whether the attorney-client privilege 
exists requires ‘common sense . . . in light of reason and experience,’ and should be determined ‘on a case-
by-case basis.’”) (quoting In re Six Grand Jury Witnesses, 979 F.2d 939, 944 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied, 
509 U.S. 905 (1993)). 
134 See, e.g., Gordon v. Boyles, 9 P.3d 1106, 1123 (Colo. 2000) (“[T]he ‘privilege applies only to 
statements made in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation that the statements will be treated 
as confidential.’”) (quoting Lanari v. People, 827 P.2d 495, 499 (Colo.1992)).  See also Mosteller & Broun, 
supra note 71 at 164–70 (reviewing cases characterizing the nature of confidentiality under privilege law). 
135 Mosteller & Broun, supra note 71, at 187–88; The terms “privacy” and “confidentiality” have a 
multitude of definitions in common parlance and in the law.  See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 
154 U.PA. L. REV. 477 (2006) (“Privacy is a concept in disarray.  Nobody can articulate what it means.”); 
Richards & Solove, supra note 90 at 125 (“Rather than protecting the information we hide away in secrecy, 
confidentiality protects the information we share with others based upon our expectations of trust and 
reliance in relationships.”) 
136 Adlman, 68 F.3d at 1500 n.1 (looking to contemporaneous documentation for evidence of intention 
of confidentiality); Suburban Sew ‘n Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 260 (D.C. Ill. 
1981) (“the relevant consideration is the intent of the defendants to maintain the confidentiality of the 
documents as manifested in the precautions they took”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 
1356 (4th Cir. 1984) (“Taking or failing to take precautions may be considered as bearing on intent to 
preserve confidentiality.” (citing In Re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 82 n.10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 
(1973))). 
137 Attorneys and their clients may be no better informed than the average consumer about tracking and 
precautions to prevent tracking. Supra note 3.  Yet, unanticipated vulnerability has not been sufficient to 
protect privilege in a number of cases.  See, e.g., Banks v. Mario Industries of Va. 650 S.E.2d 687, 695–96 
(2007) (holding deletion of a file created on an employer’s computer not sufficient to protect confidentiality 
of document retrievable by forensic computer expert); Suburban Sew ‘n Sweep, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254 at 260–
61 (holding in a “close” case that defendants could have taken “extreme” measures to protect against that 
unlikely situation in which privileged documents could be found within their garbage dumpster).   
138 See, e.g., Corey v. Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, 742 A.2d 933, 940–42 (Me. 1999) (protecting 
privilege despite inadvertent disclosure to opposing counsel because the highest protection best serves the 
goal of encouraging clients to communicate with their attorneys); United States ex rel. Mayman v. Martin 
Marietta Corp., 886 F. Supp. 1243, 1246 (D. Md. 1995) (explaining that privilege was not waived when a 
document was stolen because reasonable security precautions had been taken).   
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Fourth, reasonable precautions actually protect confidentiality, and some courts require 
actual confidentiality to establish and maintain the privilege.139  
In recent years, reasonable precautions have been a major factor in many courts’ 
consideration of whether inadvertent disclosure of privileged information should 
constitute waiver of the privilege.  Intent is not at issue in cases of inadvertent disclosure, 
so the question is whether privilege should be maintained even in light of a disclosure to 
opposing counsel or to some other third party not recognized as a participant in the 
privileged communication.  Courts have developed three general approaches to 
inadvertent disclosures.  Some courts hold privilege is waived if confidentiality is not 
achieved, despite demonstrated intent and precautions to maintain the confidential nature 
of the communications.140  A few courts take the opposite approach and protect privilege 
even when attorney-client communications are mistakenly revealed, concluding that the 
privilege is so important that it requires a high level of protection.141  The most popular 
approach to inadvertent disclosure is embodied in new Federal Rule of Evidence 502.142 
This rule, enacted in 2008, takes a middle-ground balancing approach to inadvertent 
disclosure of communications in particular circumstances.143  Rule 502 protects the 
privilege from waiver by balancing factors including whether a lawyer takes reasonable 
                                                
139 See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding no need to distinguish between 
voluntary and inadvertent disclosures because risk fell on the party seeking to enforce the privilege); 
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 370 S.E. 2d 296, 301 (1988) (“[T]he privilege is an exception to the general 
duty to disclose, is an obstacle to investigation of the truth, and should be strictly construed.”); Int’l Bus. 
Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 450 (D. Mass 1988) (“[M]istake or inadvertence is, after 
all, merely a euphemism for negligence, and, certainly . . . one is expected to pay a price for one's 
negligence.” (citing In re Financial Management Corp., 77 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. D.Mass 1987))). The 
strict accountability approach was advanced by John Henry Wigmore. “[T]he privilege remains an 
exception to the general duty to disclose.  Its benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain 
and concrete.” WIGMORE, supra note 105, at § 2291.  “The law . . . leaves to the client and attorney to take 
measures of caution sufficient to prevent being overheard by third persons.” Id. at § 2325.  Of course, 
clients too may be extremely concerned about actual confidentiality. 
140 Wigmore discouraged preservation of the privilege in cases of inadvertent waiver.  “The 
investigation of truth and the enforcement of testimonial duty demand the restriction, not the expansion, of 
these privileges.” 8 WIGMORE, supra note 104, § 2192.  In jurisdictions using this strict accountability 
approach, an attorney might need to employ sophisticated anonymizing technologies as a screen for 
internet-based research, although these tools have drawbacks.  See supra Part II. B. 2. and infra Part IV 
item 5.   
141 See supra note 140. 
142 See, e.g., Save Sunset Beach Coal. v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 78 P.3d 1, 21–22 (Hawaii 2003) 
(reviewing the three distinct approaches to inadvertent waiver taken by the states and adopting a 
reasonableness approach based on consideration of several factors including reasonableness of precautions 
to prevent disclosure, time taken to remedy the error, and overall fairness); see also Paula Schaefer, The 
Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need to Revise Professional Rules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195, 
213–14 (2010).  See An Act to Amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to Address the Waiver of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, Pub. L. No. 110-322, § 1(a), 122 Stat. 3537–57 
(2008) (codified as FED. R. EVID. 502).   
143 “The rule makes no attempt to alter federal or state law on whether a communication or information 
is protected under the attorney-client privilege or work-product immunity as an initial matter.” FED. R. 
EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.  See Elizabeth King, Waving Goodbye to Waiver? Not So Fast: 
Inadvertent Disclosure, Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege, and Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 32 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 467 (2010) (evaluating courts’ application of Rule 502 and arguing against 
interpretations that avoid a true middle-ground approach and instead apply the functional equivalent of a 
strict waiver approach). 
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precautions against inadvertent disclosure and whether overall fairness would be better 
served by waiver or maintenance of the privilege.144  One of the purposes of the rule was 
to address the potentially prohibitive costs of preventing waiver during the 
technologically complex process of electronic discovery.145   
By analogy, an attorney might be protected against a finding of waiver if she took 
reasonable precautions to avoid online research tracking, such as adjusting the settings on 
her internet browser software to prevent third-party cookies, using encryption to avoid 
deep packet inspection where possible, and adding software to the browser to prevent 
tracking by web bugs.146  Similarly, if the attorney could show she kept records of 
contract terms and privacy policies of research websites in which confidentiality is 
promised, she might be able to meet Rule 502-style standards.147   
Even if Federal Rule 502 were applied by analogy to determine whether a 
reasonable expectation of confidentiality was established for internet-based research, 
attorneys might be held to high standards for reasonable precautions.  One court has 
interpreted the rule to require “all reasonable means.”148  Most courts, though, have 
merely required “reasonable precautions.”  Whatever the standard, if the exposure of 
otherwise privileged internet-based research is widespread, Rule 502’s fairness factor, 
and even a common-sense assessment of the situation, would argue against preservation 
of the privilege. For example, if research data is tracked, sold, merged with identifying 
profile information, and made available for sale,149 opposing parties would have a strong 
argument that the claim of confidentiality simply cannot fit reality.150   
Waiver due to inadvertent disclosure is a danger with serious consequences for 
the disclosing party because courts generally hold that all records and communications of 
                                                
144 The rule’s Advisory Notes explain that “the rule is really a set of non-determinative guidelines that 
vary from case to case.”  FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.  See also King, supra note 145 
(reviewing the trend towards a balancing of factors to determine whether privilege is waived due to 
inadvertent waiver, especially after enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 in 2008). 
145 FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note.  The impact of new technologies, an increasing need 
for consultants as part of the complex development of legal advice, and the growth of regulatory pressures 
that impinge upon the privilege continue to be debated even after the corrective provisions of Federal Rule 
of Evidence 502.  Id.  See Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in 
the Federal Courts: A Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 58 S.C. L. REV. 211, 219–24 (2006) 
(demonstrating the need for predictable uniformity for recurring problems with inadvertent waiver prior to 
the enactment of Rule 502); Schaefer, supra note 144, at 195 (describing the continuing challenge of 
preventing inadvertent disclosure because of modern technologies and the limits of FED. R. EVID. 502).   
146 See supra Part II. B. 4–5. 
147 See supra Part II. B. 1–3. 
148 Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell Corp., 2008 WL 5122828 (D. Or. 2008) (finding company did not 
pursue all reasonable means of preserving the confidentiality of documents delivered during discovery and 
so failed to disprove waiver).  See King, supra note 145, at 476 (arguing that this standard is impossible to 
meet and inconsistent with the purpose of the new rule). 
149 See supra Parts II. B. 4–5. 
150 Courts resort to metaphors to express the inability of the law to fully rectify the harm from such 
disclosures.  See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc. 250 F.R.D. 251, 263 (2008) (“[A]ny order 
issued now by the court to attempt to redress these disclosures [of documents mistakenly delivered to 
opposing counsel during electronic discovery] would be the equivalent of closing the barn door after the 
animals have already run away.”); F.D.I.C. v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992) (noting the 
general problem with inadvertent disclosures) (“Once persons not within the ambit of the confidential 
relationship have knowledge of the communication, that knowledge cannot be undone. One cannot ‘unring’ 
a bell.”). 
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the same subject matter are also waived.151  Legal research that reveals communication 
between attorney and client can have far-reaching applications because many aspects of 
representation may be reflected in the search terms and strategies.   
Tracking of internet-based research could require courts to develop more nuanced 
descriptions or definitions of confidentiality.  For example, since trackers collect and re-
use research details but link them only to IP addresses and unique browser cookies, 
courts would have to assess whether this sort of anonymity were sufficient for a finding 
of confidentiality.152  Traditionally, anonymity was not recognized as protection, and 
exposure of communications to strangers prevented application of the privilege.153  
Courts may also be confronted with the question of insecure anonymity, since some 
actors in the online industry are merging anonymous records of online behavior with 
demographic data that could link offline identity with the details of the legal research.  
Courts might consider this risk in their analysis of whether attorneys took sufficient 
precautions for the purpose of establishing a reasonable expectation of confidentiality in 
their online research.  In addition, if this sophisticated tracking and merging of data 
resulted in commercially-available profiles, the destruction of anonymity could be 
considered inadvertent disclosure that constitutes subject matter waiver.   
The goals of attorney-client privilege are all served by attention to precautions to 
protect confidentiality in internet-based research.  If privilege law were to accommodate 
tracking that produced commercially-available profiles or records revealing legal 
research relating to representation, clients might indeed have reason to withhold 
information from their attorneys.  Similarly, acceptance of the intrusions of advertisers 
and diversifying internet service providers would fail to respect the integrity of the 
decision-making autonomy of the client and the importance of the fiduciary relationship 
of the attorney.  In light of these goals, courts should encourage precautions that secure a 
balance between effectiveness and manageability, and attorneys should take care to 
identify and implement reasonable precautions for online research.  
C. Work-Product Protection 
Work-product protection allows the attorney to “assemble information, sift what 
he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and 
plan his strategy without undue and needless interference.”154  Work-product protection 
can be invoked by the client, but may in some cases also be claimed by the attorney 
independently of the client.155  At the federal level, work product protection draws 
heavily on the common law recognized in the case of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 
(1947), now largely codified in rules of procedure.156  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(3) provides some immunity from discovery for materials “prepared in anticipation 
                                                
151 FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note. 
152 See supra Parts II. B. 1–3. 
153 United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 938 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978). 
154 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). 
155 2 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 
805 (5th ed. 2007). 
156 See generally Hickman, 329 U.S. 495 (holding that while attorney-client privilege did not protect 
opposing counsel’s files and mental impressions, long-standing policy protected the privacy of an 
attorney’s work-product against discovery). 
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of litigation or for trial.”157  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b)(2) provides that 
“reports, memoranda, or other documents made by the defendant, or the defendant's 
attorney or agent, during the case's investigation or defense” are not subject to 
disclosure.158  Similar protections are provided in the states through statutes or court rules 
reflecting pre- or post-Hickman doctrine as well as some common law approaches.159  
Work product can be either materials that reveal an attorney’s opinion about the client’s 
legal situation or simply materials representing factual information.  Opinion work 
product is highly protected,160 while other work product materials may be discoverable if 
an opposing party can show “substantial need” and cannot obtain substantially similar 
information through alternative means “without undue hardship.”161  
 The justifications for work-product protection overlap with those for attorney-
client privilege insofar as both ultimately are intended to support competent guidance on 
compliance with the law and the administration of justice.162  Without work product 
protection, attorneys might avoid recording their thoughts, leading to “[i]nefficiency, 
unfairness and sharp practices” in the practice of law and “demoralizing” lawyers.163  The 
result could be harm to the justice system and to the interests of clients.164  Work product 
also serves to protect fairness in the adversarial practice of law.  “Discovery was hardly 
intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on 
wits borrowed from the adversary.”165  The Hickman Court stated, “it is essential that a 
lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by 
opposing parties and their counsel.”166  The Court explained that without this protection 
“[a]n attorney’s thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own.”167 
Electronic legal research is likely to be considered attorney work-product, even 
opinion work-product.168  As one court held, “[t]he search terms used to gather these 
cases [from Lexis-Nexis] does [sic] provide a window into the attorney’s thinking.”169  
                                                
157 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) codifies protections recognized in Hickman, 329 U.S. 495.   
158 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2). 
159 2 EPSTEIN, supra note 157, at 800; Susan R. Martyn, Selected Sections of the Restatement of the Law 
3rd—The Law Governing Lawyers, SR057 ALI-ABA 41 § 87 (2010) (noting that state courts often look to 
federal decisions when applying work product protection).  
160 Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 143 F.R.D. 611 (E.D.N.C. 1992); United States v. 
Segal, No. 02-CR-112, 2004 WL 830428 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004).  
161 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated June 
5, 2008, 329 Fed. App’x 302, 2009 WL 1269487 (2d Cir.2009) (making distinctions between opinion and 
fact work product and finding that fact work product was discoverable due to substantial need and the 
absence of alternative means of access to information).    
162 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). 
163 Id.   
164 Id.; Id. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“Law-abiding people can go nowhere else to learn the ever 
changing and constantly multiplying rule by which they must behave and to obtain redress for their 
wrongs.”). 
165 Id. at 516.    
166 Id. at 510 (majority opinion). 
167 Id. at 511. 
168 Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’g Emps. in Aerospace, IFPTE Local 2001, AFL-CIO v. Boeing Co., 2009 WL 
3711599, at *4 (D. Kan. 2009) (“Counsels’ drafts and legal research” held “protected by the attorney work 
product doctrine.”). 
169 United States v. Segal, No. 02-CR-112, 2004 WL 830428, at *8 (N.D. Ill.  Mar. 31, 2004) (holding 
cases retrieved from LexisNexis to be protected as opinion work-product). 
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Courts have protected billing records when those records itemize “motive of the client in 
seeking representation, litigation strategy, or the specific nature of the service provided, 
such as researching particular areas of law.”170  Some states’ rules of procedure 
specifically identify legal research as an example of opinion work product that is 
protected from discovery in criminal and civil cases.171  One court stated, “It is hard to 
imagine a document that memorializes legal research done by a lawyer or law clerk that 
is not work product.”172   
But an opposing party could argue that the work product protection was waived 
because the attorney’s legal research was conducted through the intermediary legal 
research system if the system lacked confidentiality features.  Although waiver can be 
found simply through voluntary disclosure “to a person other than the client who has no 
interest in maintaining the confidentiality” of the legal research,173 the main concern with 
work-product disclosure is access by an opposing party in litigation.  The Restatement of 
the Law Governing Lawyers describes the potential for waiver of work-product immunity 
when “the client, the client’s lawyer, or another authorized agent of the client . . . (4) 
discloses the material to third persons in circumstances in which there is a significant 
likelihood that an adversary or potential adversary in anticipated litigation will obtain 
it.”174  The Restatement approach is consistent with one of the purposes of the work-
product rule, which is to prevent use of the attorney’s work by opposing counsel.175 
So, even if the attorney has reason to believe that the online legal research service 
shares the content of the research, work-product may yet be protected.176  If the 
                                                
170 Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d. 394, 402 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Clarke v. Am. Commerce Nat’l 
Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992). But see United States ex rel. Wiser v. Geriatric Psychological 
Servs., No. CIV. Y-96-22-2219, 2001 WL 286838 (D. Md.  Mar. 22, 2001) (finding attorney bills to be 
unprotected at later stages of litigation when attorney’s legal strategies and opinions were already made 
public).  
171 See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.4(b)(1) (“Work Product. Disclosure shall not be required of legal 
research or of records, correspondence, reports or memoranda to the extent that they contain the opinions, 
theories or conclusions of the prosecutor, members of the prosecutor's legal or investigative staff or law 
enforcement officers, or of defense counsel or defense counsel's legal or investigative staff.”); CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CODE § 2018.030 (West 2010) (dividing attorney work product into opinion and non-opinion 
categories, explicitly providing higher protection of opinion work product to legal research: “(a) A writing 
that reflects an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories is not 
discoverable under any circumstances.”). 
172 N.L.R.B. v. Jackson Hosp. Corp., 257 F.R.D. 302, 310 (2009). 
173 McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1239 (2004) (citing BP Alaska 
Exploration, Inc. v. Superior Court, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1240, 1261 (1988)). 
174 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 91; Schanfield v. Sojitz Corp. of Am., 
258 F.R.D. 211, 214 (S.D. N.Y. 2009) (finding waiver occurs when third-party disclosure party 
“substantially increases the opportunity for potential adversaries to obtain the information.” (quoting 
Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 445–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).   
175 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947). 
176 Unlike the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product doctrine “is not automatically waived 
by disclosure to a third party.”  Cellco P'ship v. Nextel Comm., Inc., Civ. A 03-725-KAJ, 2004 WL 
1542259, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.  July 9, 2004). “[D]isclosure simply to another person who has an interest in the 
information but who is not reasonably viewed as a conduit to a potential adversary will not be deemed a 
waiver of the protection of the rule.”  Bowne of N.Y. City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 479 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).  Most courts will find waiver if the disclosure “substantially increases the opportunity for 
potential adversaries to obtain the information.”  Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc. 
(Jaffe I), 237 F.R.D. 176, 183 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (citations omitted).  “The work product privilege should not 
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disclosure is to affiliate advertising companies or for marketing by sibling companies, 
and if the details of the research or the offline identity of the research are redacted or 
anonymized sufficiently, work-product may survive even a somewhat porous system for 
confidentiality.  Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evidence 502 applies to work-product 
protection as well as to attorney-client privilege to prevent waiver based on a balancing 
of factors including whether an attorney has taken reasonable precautions to protect 
confidentiality.177     
D. Ethical Requirements of Confidentiality and Competency 
As licensed members of bar associations, lawyers must conform to an ethical 
requirement to maintain confidentiality of information relating to the representation of a 
client.  The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, upon 
which nearly all state rules are based,178 contains Rule 1.6, which prohibits disclosure of 
information relating to the representation of a client without the client’s consent.179  
Comment 16 provides that “[a] lawyer must act competently to safeguard information 
relating to the representation of a client against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure 
by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or 
who are subject to the lawyer's supervision.”  Comment 17 advises an attorney to “take 
reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of 
unintended recipients” when transmitting communications.180    
This ethical obligation requires confidentiality both within and outside of the 
context of litigation. Because Rule 1.6 covers transactional as well as litigation practice, 
precautions against disclosure to “unintended recipients” must describe a broader 
category of persons than just opposing parties.  In transactional work, the client may have 
no opposing parties, and yet the ethical rule still requires confidentiality.   
The purpose of the attorney’s ethical obligation to confidentiality, as outlined in 
comments to Model Rule 1.6, is to cultivate “the trust that is the hallmark of the client-
lawyer relationship.”181  The rule is said to serve the purpose of encouraging clients to 
seek the assistance of attorneys, to provide full details of their situations so that attorneys 
can assist them in the determination of their rights under and full compliance with 
complex law.182  This ethical rule can be seen to advance the profession of the lawyer, 
serve in the administration of justice and compliance with the law, and honor the integrity 
of the lawyer-client relationship. 
                                                                                                                                            
be deemed waived unless disclosure is inconsistent with maintaining secrecy from possible adversaries.” 
Stix Prods. Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., 47 F.R.D. 334, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
177 FED. R EVID. 502. 
178 Louise L. Hill, Emerging Technology and Client Confidentiality: How Changing Technology Brings 
Ethical Dilemmas, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 15 n.97 (2010) (noting that “California remains the only 
state whose legal ethics rules do not comport with the ABA Model Rule format.”). 
179 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT  R. 1.6(a) (2004); see also Jason Popp, The Cost of Attorney-
Client Confidentiality in Post 9/11 America, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 875, 878–80 (2007) (describing 
uniformity among the ABA and state bar associations on the general purpose of rule 1.6). 
180 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT  R. 1.6 cmt. 17 (2004). 
181 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2004). 
182 Id. 
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Violation of the ethical requirement of confidentiality has several potential 
consequences.  The attorney may be disciplined through the state’s disciplinary process.  
In addition, violation of the duty of confidentiality could form a basis of a claim of 
malpractice by the client against the attorney, particularly if disclosure harmed the 
client’s interests.183  More rarely, courts may consider violation of rules as evidence of 
waiver of attorney-client privilege or work-product protection.184   
Not surprisingly, since ethics rules apply to all information relating to 
representation, state bar associations have treated legal research as protected information 
relating to the representation of a client.185   
Third party services and reliance on new technologies have generally been 
approved by bar associations, but attorneys are advised to take “reasonable 
precautions,”186 “reasonable care,”187 or “reasonable steps”188 to protect confidentiality.  
New Jersey has articulated a two-part test for reliance on third-party services that expose 
confidential client information.  Attorneys must secure “an enforceable obligation to 
preserve confidentiality and security” and must make use of “available technology to 
guard against reasonably foreseeable attempts to infiltrate the data.”189  Most 
jurisdictions have identified an attorney’s obligation to employ varying levels of 
protection, depending on the sensitivity of the confidential information.190 
Applying these tests of reasonableness, opinions have provided cautious 
acceptance of new technologies and tools such as Software as a Service,191 online files 
                                                
183 Fred. C. Zacharias, Are Evidence-Related Ethics Provisions “Law”?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315 
(2007). 
184 “Although the bar construes confidentiality broadly and exceptions narrowly, courts construe 
privilege in the opposite way because of its potential negative impact on truth seeking.” Id. at 1320.  
185 See, e.g., State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 1992-
127 (citing cases construing the work product immunity as authority for client’s entitlement to the 
“attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, legal research, and legal theories prepared in the client’s 
underlying case”). 
186 N.C. State Bar, 2005 N.C. Formal Ethics Op. 10 (2006) (“[C]yberlawyers must take reasonable 
precautions to protect confidential information transmitted to and from the client.”). 
187 See, e.g., Colo. Bar Ass’n Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 90 (1992) (requiring that attorneys exercise 
“reasonable care” in the use of mobile phones, cellular phones, facsimile machines, and other “modern 
communications technology”). 
188 State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility and Conduct, Formal Op. 2007-174 
(requiring reasonable steps to remove metadata); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 
95-398 (1995) (requiring reasonable steps to ensure persons working with client information protect 
confidentiality). 
189 N.J. Sup. Ct. Adv. Comm.on Prof. Ethics, Op. 701 (2006).  See also Me. Bd. of Overseers of the 
Bar, Op. 194 (2007) (requiring attorneys who store client files electronically to “take steps to ensure that 
the company providing . . . confidential data storage has a legally enforceable obligation to maintain the 
confidentiality”); The North Carolina State Bar has approved the use of a recycling company if the attorney 
ascertains that the company uses procedures “which effectively minimize the risk that confidential 
information might be disclosed.” N.C. State Bar, RPC Op. 133 (1992) (requiring the attorney to “take particular care 
to ensure that custodial personnel under his or her supervision are conscious of the fact that confidential information may 
be present . . . and [of] the attorney’s professional obligations”). 
190  See, e.g.,  N.C. Op. 133, supra note 191 (requiring attorneys to shred waste paper containing highly 
sensitive confidential information). 
191 N.C. State Bar Council, Proposed 2010 Formal Ethics Opinion 7, Subscribing to Software as a 
Service While Fulfilling the Duties of Confidentiality and Preservation of Client Property (April 15, 2010), 
available at http://law.gsu.edu/ccunningham/FLP/CloudComputing-CarolinaEthicsOpinion.pdf, last visited 
March 3, 2011.  The North Carolina Bar Ethics Committee voted to withdraw this proposed opinion for 
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accessible to clients,192 email,193 cell phones, and fax machines.194  The steps required to 
meet standards for reasonable precautions vary, so attorneys must conform to applicable 
rules.195 
The special challenge of email which mines message content for targeted 
advertising was addressed by the New York Bar Association Committee on Professional 
Ethics in 2008.196  This opinion provides insight into the limits of ethical accommodation 
for tracking for the purpose of delivering advertisements.  While the opinion did not 
mention a particular provider, Google’s Gmail was and is a prominent example of this 
type of service.197 The Bar concluded that the computer-generated contextual 
advertisements based solely on Gmail message content did not violate confidentiality.198  
However, the opinion did state that a violation would occur “if the e-mails were reviewed 
by human beings or if the service provider reserved the right to disclose the e-mails or the 
substance of the communications to third parties without the sender’s permission (or a 
lawful judicial order).”199  Subsequently, Google mined Gmail content to automatically 
display on the public web the names of those with whom Gmail users exchanged the 
most messages when it introduced a new social networking service called Buzz.200  
Google responded to complaints by changing the system, but lawsuits were filed based on 
federal privacy statutes and other claims.201 
                                                                                                                                            
further study on January 20, 2011.  Proposed Actions, N.C. STATE BAR, 
http://www.ncbar.gov/ethics/propeth.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2011). 
192 Ariz. Ethics Op. 09-04, Dec. 2009 (approving online file system with multi-level security including 
Secure Socket Layer encryption for remote access by clients and their attorneys). 
193 State bar opinions have generally concluded that the use of unencrypted email is not in and of itself a 
failure to protect confidential content.  Some states require “due care.”  See, e.g., Mass. Bar Ass’n Ethics 
Opinion 00-01 (2000).  Other jurisdictions require evaluations of specific situations when using email to 
communicate confidential client information. D.C. Bar Ass’n, Transmission of Confidential Information by 
Electronic Mail, Op. No. 281 (1998).  But see ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 
99-413 (1999) (advising that threats to confidentiality of internet-based activity have grown since these 
email opinions; that attorneys’ obligations to employ stronger protections have increased; and that, while 
unencrypted email retains reasonable confidentiality, highly sensitive information might require a higher 
level of protection). 
194 See Hill, supra note 180, at 17–21 (reviewing bar association opinions on confidentiality obligations 
regarding the use of email and cell phones). 
195 See Elizabeth W. King, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 801, 817–18 (2009) (comparing different state bar 
association guidelines for reasonable precautions relating to metadata). 
196 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 820 (2008), available at 
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions&CONTENTID=13652&TEMPLATE
=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (“A lawyer may use an e-mail service provider that conducts computer scans of 
e-mails to generate computer advertising, where the e-mails are not reviewed by or provided to other 
individuals.”). 
197 Commentators referred to the opinion in terms of Gmail.  Kevin Raudebaugh, Trusting the 
Machines: New York State Bar Ethics Opinion Allows Attorneys To Use Gmail, 6 WASH. J. L. TECH. & 
ARTS 83, 86 (2010) (providing details about Google’s forbearance from using Gmail content to the full 
extent of its patent description which includes the ability to create logs of user profiles and comparing 
Gmail scanning of content to virus and spam scanning activities). 
198 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 198. 
199 Id. 
200  Miguel Helft, Anger Leads to Apology from Google About Buzz, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2010, at B3 
(describing the controversial introduction of the Google Buzz service). 
201 Rick Carroll, Aspen Law Firm, Two Attorneys Take On Google, ASPEN TIMES, Jun. 1, 2010, 
available at http://www.aspentimes.com/article/20100601/NEWS/100539969/1077&ParentProfile=1058 
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Current cross-site tracking of internet research by network advertisers might fail 
New York’s test of exposure of confidential information to humans, so attorneys would 
need to take reasonable precautions to block this type of third-party tracking.  The Gmail 
example also highlights an attorney’s obligation to update confidentiality-protecting 
approaches as technologies change.202 
The escape valve for ethical confidentiality protection is informed client 
consent.203  To the extent that the attorney can competently inform a client of the risks to 
confidentiality from online research, consent would seem to secure compliance for 
confidentiality.  
In sum, ethical standards, though variable in application by jurisdiction, cover all 
online research related to representation of the client and tend to require reasonable 
precautions for confidentiality reflecting the level of sensitivity of the information.  
While an attorney should avoid disclosure not only to opposing parties but to all persons 
unnecessary to the rendering of legal advice, accommodations for new technologies and 
outsourcing indicate a standard that might excuse some tracking of online research if the 
practice conforms to this limitation.  As a final protective measure, the attorney might 
seek client consent.  
E. Synthesis of Criteria for Confidentiality 
Synthesis of the applicability and requirements of attorney-client privilege, work-
product protection, and ethical rules for confidentiality requires collapse of jurisdictional 
variations and differences in the purposes and applications of these confidentiality 
interests.204  But attorneys have to make decisions based on some type of synthesis in 
order to develop approaches that will address all three.  Reasonableness may be a useful, 
if optimistically simplistic, characterization of the collective attorney and client 
requirements for confidentiality protection.  While not all jurisdictions have followed the 
balancing approach to inadvertent disclosure of privilege or work-product, a majority has 
adopted this test, and the momentum is with this approach.  As long as reasonable 
precautions are taken to avoid disclosure to third-parties unnecessary to the provision of 
legal advice, attorney-client privilege is likely to be protected from waiver.  Work-
product standards may be the lowest of the three, perhaps requiring only that precautions 
are taken to prevent opposing parties’ access in the context of litigation.  Ethical rules 
                                                                                                                                            
(reporting several lawsuits filed against Google for introduction of the Buzz service which exposed 
information about use of the Gmail service). 
202 See, e.g., Ariz. Ethics Op. 09-04 (2009) (“As technology advances occur, lawyers should 
periodically review security measures in place to ensure that they still reasonably protect the security and 
confidentiality of the clients’ documents and information.”).  The expanded use of scanned Gmail content 
serves as a good example of how new features of a website service can impose new burdens on attorneys to 
opt-out of the feature or withdraw from the service. 
203 The ABA has concluded that outsourcing of legal work requires informed consent from the client.  
Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility in Formal Opinion 08-451 (2008) 
(finding no implied authorization to outsource legal work).  See also Kathryn A Thompson, Do Tell: Client 
Consent is a Safe Step When Lawyers Outsource Work on Cases, 96 A.B.A. J. 26 (June 2010) (reviewing 
ABA and state bar association approaches to confidentiality and client consent relating to outsourcing of 
legal work). 
204 See Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 69 (1999) 
(exploring the practical issues that different secrecy rules create). 
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require confidentiality of all online research related to representation, but even targeted 
marketing may be acceptable as long as human beings do not gain access to confidential 
information.  Informed client consent for online research can secure compliance with 
ethical rules. 
Taking the three interests as a whole, an attorney is required to take reasonable 
precautions to prevent tracking that exposes any online research to a party not necessary 
to the provision of legal advice.  Although some jurisdictions may have higher standards, 
and some relaxation of this standard may apply to work-product or ethical requirements, 
this approach should suffice for an examination of online legal research systems’ risks to 
confidentiality for attorneys and clients.   
IV. REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS 
As the Section on tracking showed, a number of precautions can significantly 
reduce tracking of online activity to create and preserve confidentiality.  The outline of 
steps that follows, however, demonstrates that securing confidentiality online is not easy.  
To maintain confidentiality of online legal research, one must take a broader approach to 
limiting online tracking than simply checking for privacy protections from individual 
legal research services or websites. 205   
1.  Contract terms with subscription services 
Attorneys should make sure their contracts with fee-based legal research services 
include specific assurances for confidentiality.  First, the services should provide support 
for encrypted access.  Second, terms should promise nondisclosure of search data to third 
parties and promise notice to the subscriber if legal process served by government entities 
allows.  At the very least, the terms should assure effective redaction of the information 
to provide anonymity of the search topics.  Third, sharing with affiliate companies should 
not include affiliates that are unrelated to legal research or could represent a prohibited 
disclosure to a party unnecessary for the rendering of legal advice.  Fourth, attorneys 
should seek provisions for limited data retention or prompt anonymization of retained 
data. 
 
2.  Privacy policy terms of “free” services 
Attorneys should seek the same terms as with subscription services.  In addition, 
if the website allows site users to opt-in or opt-out of confidentiality protections, 
attorneys should take advantage of those options.  Attorneys should update this process 
on a regular basis, perhaps twice a year or more often to monitor changes in the policy.  
                                                
205 Not only do some tracking devices collect information about use of more than one web resource, but 
lawyers are also likely to implement a variety of approaches to research on behalf of a client.  See Joe 
Custer, The Universe of Thinkable Thoughts Versus the Facts of Empirical Research, 102 LAW LIBR. J. 251 
(2010) (reporting survey of Douglas County, Kansas attorneys in which almost all respondents used more 
than one source for legal research and approximately eighty-three percent searched at least one source 
online); Heidi W. Heller, The Twenty-First Century Law Library: A Law Firm Librarian's Thoughts, 101 
LAW LIBR. J. 517 (2009) (observing that attorneys in practice use a wide range of legal research tools both 
online and in print); see also 5 AM. BAR ASS’N, 2010 LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT: ONLINE 
RESEARCH 21, 43 (2010) (reporting that the most common free website use for legal research is Google and 
reporting that over sixty-two percent of attorneys regularly used free online resources and nearly fifty-nine 
percent regularly used fee-based online legal research services).  
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Those with bar association access to a legal research service should work through the bar 
association, which should seek protections for bar members. 
 
3. Internet service providers contracts and policies 
Contracts for both home and work providers should be reviewed.  If possible, 
attorneys or firms could negotiate for confidentiality protections similar to those for 
website providers. 
 
4.  Practices to prevent tracking not controllable through contracts or privacy 
policies 
Attorneys should adjust browser software settings for privacy to prevent third 
party cookies and to delete browsing histories.  They should also limit data collection by 
third parties through Flash cookies by adjusting Flash Player settings.  Whenever 
possible, encryption should be used to secure confidentiality against deep packet 
inspection by internet service providers.  In addition, attorneys should avoid linking to 
outside websites from query results produced by unencrypted websites.  Attorneys should 
also consider opting out of advertiser tracking and website analytics services such as 
Google Analytics when those options are available.  
 
5.  Extreme measures  
Attorneys could also consult technology experts on the utility of software to 
anonymize use of the internet, such as Tor or TrackmeNot for highly sensitive client 
research.  
V. THE NEED FOR EXPERTS 
The cost of protecting confidentiality online is high, especially for individual 
attorneys.  Just like the cost of protecting confidential information from disclosure during 
electronic discovery, the steps required to protect online activity from compromising 
tracking are cumbersome and require constant updating to address new technology.  Two 
researchers estimated that if consumers read and compared website privacy policies, the 
national opportunity cost in 2008 would have been on the order of $781 billion.206  
Attorneys must read and interact with website polices in addition to taking a number of 
other steps to preserve confidentiality in internet research.  Solo practitioners and small 
firm lawyers in particular need help to competently address confidentiality requirements 
in the online environment, because these lawyers are less likely to have the support of in-
house technology experts. 
A number of existing resources could devote energy and expertise to producing 
ongoing guidance for lawyers on confidentiality practices of legal research 
intermediaries, and could also help negotiate or advocate for better protections through 
market influence or changes in the law of tracking.   
                                                
206 Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J.L. & 
POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2008-2009). Studies show that researchers do not in fact read and compare 
privacy policies. See Haynes, supra note 13, at 588 (citing several studies that show internet users do not 
read website privacy policies).   
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The Sedona Conference nonprofit has produced reports on electronic discovery 
and confidentiality and related topics and so might also examine practical and law-based 
solutions to the problem of tracking of online legal research.207 The American Bar 
Association has established a Commission on Ethics 20/20 to “perform a thorough review 
of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the U.S. system of lawyer 
regulation in the context of advances in technology and global legal practice 
developments” and to make policy recommendations over the next couple of years.208  
This group could consider the ethical implications of online tracking of legal research and 
make recommendations about how rules can address this challenge.  State bar 
associations and any other bar associations with consortium subscriptions to legal 
research systems should negotiate for terms for confidentiality including encryption 
support.   
Other groups might provide more ongoing practical guidance on how to protect 
the confidentiality of online legal research through technology and research habits and 
might in the process influence the practices of websites and internet service providers.  
The American Bar Association Legal Technology Resource Center already provides 
some guidance on the use of technology, including comparison charts on technology 
products and a chart on metadata ethics opinions.209  Some organizations have expertise 
in assessing and responding to confidentiality risks online, including library associations 
and privacy advocacy organizations.210  These organizations are likely to produce 
assessments and guidelines that would be useful to lawyers attempting to take reasonable 
precautions for online research confidentiality.  A collaborative effort among some or all 
of these groups could produce a confidentiality seal system or regularly updated chart 
                                                
207 The Sedona Conference is a nonprofit research and educational institute dedicated to the advanced 
study of law and policy in the areas of antitrust law, complex litigation, and intellectual property rights. 
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, http://www.thesedonaconference.org/ (last visited Sep. 5, 2010) (linking to a 
number of reports relating to best practices on topics such as The Sedona Conference Commentary on Non-
Party Production & Rule 45 Subpoenas: A Project of The Sedona Conference® Working Group on 
Electronic Document Retention & Production (WG1) April 2008). 
208Agenda, THE ABA COMMISSION ON ETHICS 20/20, http://www.abanet.org/ethics2020/agenda.pdf (last 
visited Sep. 5, 2010). 
209 Resources—Legal Technology Resource Center, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/departments_offices/legal_technology_resources/resources.html. (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2011). 
210 See, e.g., Trina J. Magi, A Content Analysis of Library Vendor Privacy Policies:  DO They Meet Our 
Standards?, 71 COLL. & RES. LIBR. 254 (2010) (reviewing several standards for reader or researcher 
privacy including library organization standards, testing online research systems’ promises for compliance, 
and reporting aggregate statistics). The American Library Association (“ALA”) Office of Intellectual 
Freedom has a “Campaign for Reader Privacy” and pursues a number of initiatives to support librarian 
conformity to the ALA ethical commitment to confidentiality of library use.  OFFICE OF INTELLECTUAL 
FREEDOM, AM. LIBR. ASS’N, http://www.ala.org/Template.cfm?Section=oif (last visited Sep. 5, 2010).  
Similarly, the American Association of Law Libraries (“AALL”) has issued policy statements and 
published ethical principles to protect confidentiality. AALL members include librarians who work directly 
with lawyers and so would be good partners in maintaining best practices for online legal research 
confidentiality.  A number of privacy advocacy organizations assess and report on matters relating to 
confidentiality of online legal research including The Center for Democracy & Technology, 
http://www.cdt.org/; The Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/;  Electronic Privacy 
Information Center (“EPIC”), http://epic.org/; and The Future of Privacy Forum, 
http://www.futureofprivacy.org/.   
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that could specifically address attorneys’ needs for confidentiality online.211  Even if 
these seals did not appear on research websites, a regularly updated chart categorizing 
online research systems by their level of support for confidentiality could be published on 
the ABA Legal Technology Resource Center website and linked from other sites.  This 
type of evaluation system could also induce websites and internet service providers to 
offer options for higher protection of confidentiality.  
VI. STRENGTHENING THE LAW OF ONLINE TRACKING 
If the collaborative guidance and market influence of experts fails to deliver 
reasonable and effective precautions in light of evolving online tracking, confidential 
online legal research will have to be secured through legislation or regulation.  Groups 
representing consumer interests, including the Federal Trade Commission, have made 
calls for greater transparency and control over online data collection and re-use so that 
consumers can make meaningful choices about the exchange of their search data for 
services.212  However, proposals for new legislation or regulation have met with 
resistance from the commercial sector because new forms of advertising are argued to be 
the best way to fund innovation and deliver services,213 or because of fears that regulation 
will unfairly apply to only part of the industry.214  The debate about online tracking is 
                                                
211 Privacy seals are already offered through such entities as TRUSTe which provides consumer privacy 
assurance.  See, e.g., TRUSTE, http://www.truste.com/about_TRUSTe/ (last visited Sep. 5, 2010).  These 
broader systems are not geared towards the standards necessary to protect confidentiality of online legal 
research for legal representation and have suffered some criticisms for their business models which are 
based on fees paid by sites that TRUSTe evaluates.  See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy? 
52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1526–27 (2000) (“If TRUSTe were to start suspending trustmarks, it would lose 
revenue; if it were to get a reputation for being too aggressive toward clients, they might decide they are 
better off without a trustmark and the attendant hassle.”); Xiaourui Hu, et al, The Effects of Web Assurance 
Seals on Consumers’ Initial Trust in an Online Vendor: A Functional Perspective, 48 DECISION SUPPORT 
SYSTEMS 407, 409 (2010) (providing a chart comparing empirical studies on specific web assurance seals 
for privacy, security, and transaction-integrity). 
212 FTC STAFF REPORT ON BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING, supra note 37, at 2; Letter from American Civil 
Liberties Union to U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy and U.S. Senator Jeff Sessions (Nov. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/letter-support-s-1490-personal-data-privacy-and-security-act 
(supporting legislation that would, among other things, require consumers’ access to their own profiles and 
sources of information held in profiles maintained by data aggregators); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
PRELIMINARY FTC STAFF REPORT: PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE (2010) 
(identifying business practices that could improve consumer privacy and raising the question of whether the 
agency should propose legislation if industry fails to improve consumer protections), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf; DEPT. OF COMMERCE INTERNET POL. TASK 
FORCE, COMMERCIAL DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY:  A DYNAMIC POLICY 
FRAMEWORK, (2010) (recommending baseline protections for online consumer privacy that go beyond 
industry self-regulation), available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/2010/IPTF_Privacy_GreenPaper_12162010.pdf.   
213 [Prepared] Testimony of Michael Zaneis before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, & 
Consumer Protection, H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE 3–4 (July 22, 2010) 
http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/Media/file/Hearings/CTCP/072210_CTCP_Best_Practices/Z
aneis.Testimony.pdf (arguing that industry-self regulation allows the evolving online industry to be nimble 
in response to consumer concerns and arguing against legislation that would regulate online advertising).  
214 Legislative Hearing on Communications Networks and Consumer Privacy Before the H. Comm. On 
Energy & Commerce, Subcomm. On Commc’ns, Tech. & the Internet, 111th Cong. 5 (April 23, 2009) 
(statement of Dorothy Attwood, Senior Vice President, Public Policy & Chief Privacy Officer, AT&T, Inc.) 
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broader in scope than the question of how to protect the attorneys’ and clients’ interests 
in confidentiality of online legal research.  But if non-legal approaches fail to protect 
these long-standing confidentiality interests, this harm surely adds weight to arguments 
that online privacy merits increased protection. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The commercial tracking of online legal research is a growing threat to the three 
confidentiality interests relating to legal representation.  Attorney-client privilege, 
attorney work-product protection, and an attorney’s ethical rule of confidentiality are 
bedrock principles for the United States justice system and for the practice of law.  The 
rapid expansion in data tracking technologies, decreasing cost of data storage, and 
advancements in data merging techniques and practices have transformed the internet 
into a dangerous place at the same time that legal research is shifting to website-based 
systems.  Attorneys must take reasonable precautions to prevent exposure of confidential 
information to third parties not necessary for the rendering of legal advice.  Currently, an 
array of precautions must be implemented to protect these three confidentiality interests.  
To assist in identifying and updating best practices, attorneys should identify experts who 
can provide ongoing advice and even evaluate online services’ confidentiality support 
through a web assurance seal or evaluative chart designed specifically for attorneys.  If 
even these collaborative steps are unsuccessful in securing reasonable and effective 
precautions for confidential online legal research, legislation or regulation must provide 
the needed protection.215  Attorneys are not the only online researchers who seek control 
over tracking.  Laws that support transparency and require some consumer control could 
address other confidentiality interests threatened by trends in data collection and re-use.  
Confidentiality of legal representation is not just a benefit to the attorney and client in a 
particular relationship, but a societal value that has withstood the test of time and should 
remain protected.216  
                                                                                                                                            
(arguing that any legislative or regulatory restrictions on behavioral advertising must apply to “all entities 
involved in Internet advertising, including ad networks, search engines and ISPs, will need to adhere to a 
consistent set of principles” in order to be effective and fair); Testimony of Dr. Alma Whitten, supra note 
17, at 12 (testifying that “Google supports the development of comprehensive, baseline privacy legislation” 
as long as the legislation has even-handed application to all data sources, both online and offline).  
215 See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices Principles and The Architecture of Privacy (What 
Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2001) (critiquing the view that market forces address 
consumer online privacy needs and advocating reliance on  the law as the more democratic expression of 
citizens’ privacy interests). 
216 See James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy¸ 78 WASH. L. REV. 1 
(2003) (arguing that if privacy were addressed as a societal rather than individual concern, a more 
comprehensive regulatory approach would emerge).   
